Treasury Sanctions Networks enabling Kata’ib Hizballah and Lebanese Hizballah
WASHINGTON—Today, as part of Operation Economic Outcast, the U.S. Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) took action against the networks enabling the Iranian regime to wreak havoc in the Middle East through its terrorist proxies. Today’s action targets entities and individuals that support Kata’ib Hizballah (KH) and Hizballah.
Additionally, OFAC announced today an enforcement action against an individual for providing services to companies in Iran, and updated its Iran Statement of Licensing Policy to a presumption of denial except in limited circumstances.
“Operation Economic Outcast is targeting those who continue to stand with the failing Iranian regime,” said Secretary of the Treasury Scott Bessent. “Whether they finance terror, launder money, or help Iran evade sanctions, we will find them, cut them off from the U.S. financial system, and dismantle the networks keeping the regime afloat.”
KH and Lebanese Hizballah fuel Iran’s destabilizing influence in the Middle East, endanger U.S. and partner forces, and facilitate extensive sanctions evasion schemes. Spread across Iraq, Lebanon, the United Arab Emirates, and Türkiye, today’s targets underscore the global reach of the Iranian regime’s illicit networks and the serious threat posed by the terrorist proxy organizations that operate on its behalf. Today’s designations strike at the core of Iran’s most dangerous proxies—groups that not only terrorize civilians across the Middle East but also serve as Tehran’s primary instruments for projecting violence, subversion, and global destabilization.
Today’s action is being taken pursuant to Executive Order (E.O.) 13224, as amended, which targets terrorists and their supporters. The U.S. Department of State designated KH as a Specially Designated Global Terrorist (SDGT) pursuant to E.O. 13224 and as a Foreign Terrorist Organization (FTO) pursuant to section 219 of the Immigration and Nationality Act on June 24, 2009 for being responsible for multiple terrorist attacks against Iraqi, U.S., and other targets in Iraq. Hizballah was designated as a SDGT pursuant to E.O. 13224 on October 31, 2001, and as an FTO pursuant to section 219 of the Immigration and Nationality Act on October 8, 1997. Today’s action is also being taken pursuant to E.O. 13902, which targets persons operating in the petroleum, financial, petrochemical, and other sectors of the Iranian economy.
OPERATION ECONOMIC OUTCAST IS ISOLATING THE IRANIAN REGIME
Announced by Secretary Bessent on August 24, 2026, dubbed Economic D-Day, Operation Economic Outcast is severing the remaining economic lifelines that sustain the Iranian regime. Treasury has mapped the networks, facilitators, and financial channels that Iran uses to smuggle oil, evade sanctions, and fund terror. Working with partners across the U.S. government, the European Union, United Kingdom, Gulf partners, and others, Treasury is targeting any source of the regime’s illicit revenue, as well as its sanctions evasion schemes to move funds.
Operation Economic Outcast significantly expanded sanctions risk for those who continue to choose to do business with Iran. Treasury warned that any entity facilitating money laundering or sanctions evasion on behalf of Iran risks being cut off from the U.S. financial system. It also expanded secondary sanctions exposure for those who continue doing business with the Iranian regime and will accelerate the pace of U.S. enforcement. More information on Operation Economic Outcast is available here.
IRAQI MILITIA MEMBERS AND BUSINESSMEN SUPPORTING IRAN
KH is a leading militant faction within Iran’s so-called “Axis of Resistance” and receives training, weapons, funding, intelligence, and logistical support from Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps–Qods Force (IRGC-QF), itself designated as a terrorist organization by the United States.
KH is also the most influential faction within Iraq’s militia-dominated Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF). KH members occupy key leadership positions within the PMF’s governing body, the Popular Mobilization Commission (PMC), including positions that oversee the PMF’s intelligence, missiles, anti-armor, and special forces directorates. Through this influence, KH is a major beneficiary of the more than $2.6 billion in annual Iraqi government funding allocated to the PMF, and they instead siphon the Iraqi people’s wealth to support the Iranian regime, increase their luxurious life styles, and support their own terrorist efforts
KATA’IB HIZBALLAH TARGETS AMERICANS AND ADVANCES IRANIAN INTERESTS
KH seeks to threaten the American people at home and abroad, as most recently evidenced by the May 16, 2026, arrest of a senior KH commander for attempting to arrange the bombing of a New York synagogue and additional Jewish institutions in Los Angeles and Scottsdale. Since February 2026, KH and the other Iranian-aligned militia groups in Iraq have conducted hundreds of attacks against U.S. and Coalition forces in Iraq and across the region. These attacks include the use of explosive drones and indiscriminate rocket fire that puts the lives and livelihoods of innocent Iraqi civilians at risk and directly threatens the U.S. Embassy and U.S. diplomatic facilities. These attacks are carried out in furtherance of Iran’s desire to dominate Iraq, and they serve neither the security nor the economic interests of the Iraqi people.
Today, OFAC is taking action against four KH commanders and members: Ali Hasan Farhan Al-Lami (Al-Lami), a senior KH Commander, and Hussein Ahmed Hussein Al-Dhuhaibawi (Al-Dhuhaibawi), Mohamed Ameen Fadhil Ali Al-Shaikhli (Al-Shaikhli), and Karrar Mohammed Qasim Al-Hraishawi (Al-Hraishawi), who are each active KH members.
Al-Lami, Al-Dhuhaibawi, Al-Shaikhli, and Al-Hraishawi are all being designated pursuant to E.O. 13224, as amended, for having acted or purported to act for or on behalf of, directly or indirectly, Kata’ib Hizballah.
IRANIAN ELEMENTS WITHIN THE PMF AND PMC ADVANCE IRAN’S INTERESTS IN IRAQ
The PMF and the PMC are heavily dominated and influenced by Iran’s militias, such as KH, that operate at the direction of the IRGC-QF and support the IRGC-QF’s interests and activities in Iraq.
Abbas Jawad Kadhim Al-Tameemi (Al-Tameemi) is a senior official with the PMC’s Directorate of Technical Equipment (DTE), which is headed by U.S.-designated terrorist and former KH official Salah Mahdi Hantush al-Maksusi. OFAC designated al-Maksusi in 2012 for his involvement in KH’s attacks on U.S. and coalition forces in Iraq. Al-Tameemi provides strategic guidance and technical advice for the PMC regarding foreign military purchases and is considered a defense equipment expert within the PMC and Iran-aligned militia groups. Through his position and support services to PMC, Al-Tameemi enables the provision of critical financial and military support to the IRGC-QF.
Abdullah Nadhim Luaibi Al Ameri (Al Ameri) is a United Arab Emirates (UAE)-based Iraqi arms dealer and founder and chief executive officer (CEO) of Iraq-based Al-Brouj For General Contracting Company Ltd (Al-Brouj). Al Ameri, via his control of Al-Brouj, provides various goods and services to the PMC, including likely unlawful procurement of equipment with military applications. Through Al-Brouj, Al Ameri provides support, such as maintenance on Russian-provided helicopters, to Iraqi military organizations that operate under the direction of the IRGC-QF.
Khaldoon Naser Maryoosh Al-Abada (Al-Abada) is a representative of Iraqi PMC-affiliated procurement company Ain Al-Iraq For Protecting Technology and Audio, Visual, and Communications Solutions Company Ltd (Ain Al-Iraq) who coordinates the acquisition of foreign defense equipment and components with the PMC and provides consulting services and advice to the PMC. Ain Al-Iraq has provided support to PMC and IRGC-QF-controlled networks and affiliated individuals in Iraq. The Iraqi government has used Ain Al-Iraq for business dealings between Iraq, Russia, Iran, and China to acquire defense components, which have been part of larger public corruption and sanctions evasion schemes in Iraq. Ain Al-Iraq has also been used in the attempted purchase of U.S. defense articles through its sanctions evasion networks.
Al-Tameemi, Al-Ameri and Ain Al-Iraq are being designated pursuant to E.O. 13224, as amended, for having materially assisted, sponsored, or provided financial, material, or technological support for, or goods or services to or in support of, Saleh Mahdi Hantush al-Maksusi.
Al-Brouj is being designated pursuant to E.O. 13224, as amended, for being owned, controlled, or directed by, or having acted or purported to act for or on behalf of, directly or indirectly, Al Ameri.
Al Abada is being designated pursuant to E.O. 13224, as amended, for having acted or purported to act for or on behalf of, directly or indirectly, Ain Al-Iraq.
IRAQI BUSINESSMEN AIDING IRANIAN SANCTIONS EVASION
Majid Ali Akbar Namdar Al-Mandalawi uses a variety of Iraqi private banks to transfer funding through his hawala, Shams & Bahr Trading Company L.L.C.
This Dubai-based exchange has been used to remit millions of dollars from Iraq to Iran via the UAE. Shams & Bahr Trading Company is also owned by Abdulhasan Ali A. Namdar Al-Mandalawi.
Shams & Bahr Trading Company, L.L.C. is being designated pursuant to E.O. 13902 for operating in the financial sector of the Iranian economy. Majid Ali Akbar Namdar Al-Mandalawi and Abdulhasan Ali A. Namdar Al-Mandalawi are being designated pursuant to E.O. 13902 for having acted or purported to act for or on behalf of, directly or indirectly, Shams & Bahr Trading Company L.L.C.
HIZBALLAH CASH SMUGGLING COLLABORATION WITH IRGC-QF
The IRGC-QF uses front companies to transfer funds derived from Iranian oil sales to exchange houses in the region. IRGC-QF members in Lebanon work with Hizballah financial officials to receive the funds in Lebanon via several Lebanese money exchangers, to include Hussein Ibrahim and Abdallah Hamieh. U.S.-designated Mohamad Noureddine has also been involved in transferring these funds. Together these Lebanese businessmen and money changers constitute a significant channel for transferring money from the IRGC-QF to Hizballah. Between May 2025 and September 2025, Hussein Ibrahim and Abdallah Hamieh transferred hundreds of millions of dollars from the IRGC-QF to Hizballah. Once the money is in Lebanon, U.S.-designated Hizballah member Ossama Jaber worked with Ghaith Hussein Wehbe (Wehbe), a Hizballah money courier, to personally collect money from these cash exchangers on behalf of Hizballah financial officials. Hizballah uses these funds to purchase weapons, manufacture equipment, and pay salaries to its members.
U.S.-designated Hizballah financier Hamdi Zaher El Dine (Hamdi) directs and operates several Lebanese gold and cash exchanges through family members and close associates to evade sanctions. While Hamdi Zaher El Dine is not listed on the legal structure of these Lebanese exchange houses, he directs family members who either work in, or are in the legal structure of, these exchange houses. Hamdi’s sister, Mervat Jamil Zahreldine, works at two of these exchanges on Hamdi’s behalf, holding a position at Yousef Ibrahim Mansour and Partner for Exchange, and Power of Attorney at Gold Pro SARL. While Gold Pro SARL is not licensed by the Central Bank of Lebanon to import gold, Hamdi uses hawalas to purchase gold from Dubai, UAE, and then uses couriers to bring the gold into Lebanon.
Similarly, at the direction of Hamdi, Syria- and Türkiye-based Amir Al-Makansi operates a gold exchange company based in Syria with additional offices in Istanbul, Türkiye. While this exchange house primarily deals in gold, it also uses Lebanese exchange houses to change currency for Hamdi in large denomination bills that are known in the Lebanese exchange sector to be frequently sourced to Hizballah.
Hussein Ibrahim, Abdallah Hamieh, and Wehbe are being designated pursuant to E.O. 13224, as amended, for having materially assisted, sponsored, or provided financial, material, or technological support for, or goods or services to or in support of, Hizballah.
Mervat and Amir Al-Makansi are being designated pursuant to E.O. 13224, as amended, for having materially assisted, sponsored, or provided financial, material, or technological support for, or goods or services to or in support of, Hamdi.
YIM Exchange and Gold Pro SARL are being designated pursuant to E.O. 13224, as amended, for being owned, controlled, or directed by, or having acted or purported to act for or on behalf of, directly or indirectly, Hamdi.
IRAN SANCTIONS ENFORCEMENT
Dealings with sanctioned parties, as well as jurisdictions such as Iran, are generally prohibited, and Iran-related enforcement actions continue to be a top priority for OFAC. Today, OFAC announced that an individual has agreed to pay $1,427,230 to settle their potential civil liability for providing management consulting and advisory services to one of Iran’s leading software solutions companies. The individual also received Iranian-origin dividends to their U.S. bank accounts and acquired real property in Iran. The settlement amount reflects OFAC’s determination that the apparent violations were egregious and not voluntarily self-disclosed. OFAC’s investigation and resolution of this matter was in cooperation with the Federal Bureau of Investigation, Los Angeles Field Office, Orange County Resident Agency. OFAC’s enforcement campaign to hold accountable U.S. and foreign persons who violate Iran sanctions will continue as part of Operation Economic Outcast. Additional information about today’s enforcement action can be found in OFAC’s Enforcement Release.
IRAN SPECIFIC LICENSE DENIALS
Today, OFAC published a new Iran Statement of Licensing Policy, notifying the public of a presumption of denial except as required by law or in certain circumstances, such as risk to life, limb, or environmental safety. Additionally, OFAC’s Licensing Division immediately began denying the vast majority of outstanding Iran-related specific license requests. OFAC will maintain this licensing policy until Iran changes its behavior, including obstructing the Strait of Hormuz, attacking U.S. personnel and partners in the Gulf, and pursuing nuclear and conventional weapons. Applicants are encouraged to subscribe to OFAC Recent Actions for further updates.
SANCTIONS IMPLICATIONS
As a result of today’s action, all property and interests in property of the designated or blocked persons described above that are in the United States or in the possession or control of U.S. persons are blocked and must be reported to OFAC. In addition, any entities that are owned, directly or indirectly, individually or in the aggregate, 50 percent or more by one or more blocked persons are also blocked. Unless authorized by OFAC, or exempt, OFAC’s regulations generally prohibit all transactions by U.S. persons or within (or transiting) the United States that involve any property or interests in property of blocked persons.
Violations of U.S. sanctions may result in the imposition of civil or criminal penalties on U.S. and foreign persons. OFAC may impose civil penalties for sanctions violations on a strict liability basis. OFAC’s Economic Sanctions Enforcement Guidelines provide more information regarding OFAC’s enforcement of U.S. economic sanctions. In addition, financial institutions and other persons may risk exposure to sanctions for engaging in certain transactions or activities involving designated or otherwise blocked persons. The prohibitions include the making of any contribution or provision of funds, goods, or services by, to, or for the benefit of any designated or blocked person, or the receipt of any contribution or provision of funds, goods, or services from any such person. Non-U.S. persons are also prohibited from causing or conspiring to cause U.S. persons to wittingly or unwittingly violate U.S. sanctions, as well as engaging in conduct that evades U.S. sanctions. Individuals located in the U.S. or abroad who provide information about sanctions violations to FinCEN’s whistleblower incentive program may be eligible for awards if the information they provide leads to a successful enforcement action that results in monetary penalties exceeding $1,000,000.
Furthermore, engaging in certain transactions involving the persons designated today may risk the imposition of secondary sanctions on participating foreign financial institutions. OFAC can prohibit or impose strict conditions on opening or maintaining, in the United States, a correspondent account or a payable-through account of a foreign financial institution that knowingly conducts or facilitates any significant transaction on behalf of a person who is designated pursuant to the relevant authority.
The power and integrity of OFAC sanctions derive not only from OFAC’s ability to designate and add persons to the SDN List, but also from its willingness to remove persons from the SDN List consistent with the law. The ultimate goal of sanctions is not to punish, but to bring about a positive change in behavior. For information concerning the process for seeking removal from an OFAC list, including the SDN List, or to submit a request, please refer to OFAC’s guidance on Filing a Petition for Removal from an OFAC List.
BLOW THE WHISTLE ON IRAN-RELATED ILLICIT FINANCE
Also today, Treasury’s Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN) is issuing a Whistleblower Bulletin in support of Operation Economic Outcast. FinCEN maintains a whistleblower incentive program for the public to submit information about violations of certain statutes enforced by Treasury and the Department of Justice, including the Bank Secrecy Act (BSA) and the national security laws that serve as the foundation for U.S. trade and economic sanctions.
FinCEN welcomes tips regarding individuals or entities that may be violating the BSA or OFAC-administered sanctions programs. This includes information about violations of these authorities that may involve the use of Iranian proxies and facilitators operating outside of Iran. Individuals who voluntarily provide such information may be eligible for awards.
Treasury is prepared to take enforcement actions against any foreign company supporting illicit Iranian commerce, and, as necessary, may act against foreign financial institutions and companies that facilitate Iran’s activities when such activities violate the BSA or U.S. sanctions laws. Potential violations of OFAC sanctions require a nexus to the United States, including direct or indirect transactions with or involving the United States, U.S. persons, or entities owned or controlled by U.S. persons. Non-U.S. persons are also prohibited from certain dealings, including from causing U.S. persons to wittingly or unwittingly violate U.S. sanctions, conspiring to violate U.S. sanctions on Iran, and engaging in conduct that evades U.S. sanctions.
To learn more about the whistleblower program, including how to report tips, visit FinCEN’s webpage for the Office of the Whistleblower.
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