WASHINGTON — Today, the U.S. Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC), in coordination with the U.S. Department of Justice, is targeting a network of six entities and two individuals based in Iran, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), and the People’s Republic of China (PRC) responsible for the procurement of unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) components on behalf of Iran-based Qods Aviation Industries (QAI)—a leading manufacturer for Iran’s UAV program. This network has also facilitated procurement for other entities in Iran's military-industrial complex, to include Iran Aircraft Manufacturing Industrial Company (HESA) and Shahid Bakeri Industrial Group (SBIG). Today’s action marks the second round of sanctions targeting Iranian weapons proliferators since the President issued National Security Presidential Memorandum 2 on February 4, 2025, ordering a campaign of maximum pressure on Iran.
“Iran’s proliferation of UAVs and missiles—both to its terrorist proxies in the region and to Russia for its use against Ukraine—continues to threaten civilians, U.S. personnel, and our allies and partners,” said Secretary of the Treasury Scott Bessent. “Treasury will continue to disrupt Iran’s military-industrial complex and its proliferation of UAVs, missiles, and conventional weapons that often end up in the hands of destabilizing actors, including terrorist proxies.”
Today’s action was taken pursuant to Executive Order (E.O.) 13382, which targets proliferators of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and their means of delivery. OFAC designated QAI pursuant to E.O. 13382 on December 12, 2013 for having provided, or attempted to provide, financial, material, technological or other support for, or goods or services in support of, Iran’s Ministry of Defense and Armed Forces Logistics (MODAFL), and for being owned or controlled by, or acting or purporting to act for or on behalf of, directly or indirectly, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC). The United States designated MODAFL and the IRGC pursuant to E.O. 13382 in October 2007 and designated HESA pursuant to E.O. 13382 in September 2008. SBIG was included in the Annex to E.O. 13382 in July 2005.
Concurrent with today's designations, the Justice Department also announced criminal charges against Hossein Akbari, 63, and Reza Amidi, 62, both of Iran, and an Iranian company, Rah Roshd Company (Rah Roshd) in the Eastern District of New York. As alleged, the defendants conspired to provide material support to the IRGC, a designated foreign terrorist organization, and engaged in a scheme to procure U.S. technology for Iranian attack drones. Akbari and Amidi remain at large.
"The Justice Department will continue to put maximum pressure on the Iranian regime. We will relentlessly dismantle illicit supply chains funneling American technology into the hands of Iran's military and terrorist organizations and pursue those complicit in operations that threaten our country," said Sue J. Bai, head of the Justice Department's National Security Division.
THE RAH ROSHD INTERNATIONAL TRADE EXCHANGES DEVELOPMENT NETWORK
Iran-based Rah Roshd International Trade Exchanges Development (Rah Roshd) has contracted with QAI and procured the servo motor model used in the Mohajer-6 combat UAV, as well as various parts and electronic components, on behalf of QAI. Rah Roshd has also sold motors and parts totaling hundreds of thousands of dollars to HESA (which develops and manufactures UAVs, as well as military and civilian aircraft in Iran) and SBIG (which is responsible for the development and production of Iran’s solid-fuel ballistic missile program). OFAC designated Reza Amidi (Amidi), who has served as a commercial manager at QAI, has also served as Rah Roshd’s commercial manager. OFAC designated Amidi pursuant to E.O. 13382 in December 2013.
Rah Roshd is being designated pursuant to E.O. 13382 for having provided, or attempted to provide, financial, material, technological or other support for, or goods or services in support of, QAI.
Iran-based Hossein Akbari (Akbari) is the managing director of Rah Roshd and has procured the servo motor model used in the Mohajer-6 combat UAV on behalf of Rah Roshd.
Akbari is being designated pursuant to E.O. 13382 for acting or purporting to act for or on behalf of, directly or indirectly, Rah Roshd.
Iran-based Abbas Yousefnejad (Yousefnejad) has procured items including parts, cables, and motors on behalf of Rah Roshd and serves as the company’s alternate inspector.
UAE-based Infracom Communication Networks FZE (Infracom) has facilitated the procurement of motors for Rah Roshd and its personnel. Infracom has also coordinated between Rah Roshd and the manufacturer of the servo motor model used in the Mohajer-6 combat UAV.
PRC-based motor manufacturer Zibo Shenbo Machinelectronics Co Ltd (Zibo Shenbo) authorized Rah Roshd to be its distributor in Iran and has supplied Rah Roshd with tens of thousands of motors for the end user SBIG.
Yousefnejad, Infracom, and Zibo Shenbo are being designated pursuant to E.O. 13382 for having provided, or attempted to provide, financial, material, technological or other support for, or goods or services in support of, Rah Roshd.
FINANCIAL INTERMEDIARIES FOR RAH ROSHD AND INFRACOM
UAE-based Diamond Castle Electronics Trading LLC (Diamond Castle) and Future Trends Goods Wholesalers LLC (Future Trends) have facilitated Rah Roshd’s procurement efforts by serving as financial intermediaries between Rah Roshd and international suppliers including Zibo Shenbo. For example, Diamond Castle has facilitated Rah Roshd’s procurement of motors ultimately destined for SBIG.
Diamond Castle and Future Trends are being designated pursuant to E.O. 13382 for having provided, or attempted to provide, financial, material, technological or other support for, or goods or services in support of, Rah Roshd.
UAE-based Phenomena International General Trading LLC (Phenomena) has facilitated Infracom’s procurement of electronics by serving as a financial intermediary for Infracom.
Phenomena is being designated pursuant to E.O. 13382 for having provided, or attempted to provide, financial, material, technological or other support for, or goods or services in support of, lnfracom.
SANCTIONS IMPLICATIONS
As a result of today’s action, all property and interests in property of the designated person(s) described above that are in the United States or in the possession or control of U.S. persons is/are blocked and must be reported to OFAC. In addition, any entities that are owned, directly or indirectly, individually or in the aggregate, 50 percent or more by one or more blocked persons are also blocked. Unless authorized by a general or specific license issued by OFAC or exempt, U.S. sanctions generally prohibit all transactions by U.S. persons or within (or transiting) the United States that involve any property or interests in property of designated or otherwise blocked persons. Violations of U.S. sanctions may result in the imposition of civil or criminal penalties on U.S. and foreign persons. OFAC may impose civil penalties for sanctions violations on a strict liability basis. OFAC’s Economic Sanctions Enforcement Guidelines provide more information regarding OFAC’s enforcement of U.S. economic sanctions. In addition, financial institutions and other persons may risk exposure to sanctions for engaging in certain transactions or activities with designated or otherwise blocked persons.
Exports, reexports, or transfers of items subject to U.S. export controls involving persons included on the SDN List pursuant to E.O. 13382 may be subject to additional restrictions administered by the Department of Commerce, Bureau of Industry and Security. See 15 C.F.R. section 744.8 for additional information.
The power and integrity of OFAC sanctions derive not only from OFAC’s ability to designate and add persons to the SDN List, but also from its willingness to remove persons from the SDN List consistent with the law. The ultimate goal of sanctions is not to punish, but to bring about a positive change in behavior. For information concerning the process for seeking removal from an OFAC list, including the SDN List, please refer to OFAC’s Frequently Asked Question 897 here and to submit a request for removal, click here.
Click here for more information on the individuals and entities designated today.
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