WASHINGTON — Today, the Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) is targeting three vessels and their owners for providing support to Ansarallah, commonly known as the Houthis, which is part of the Iranian regime’s network of terrorist proxies and partners. The group has deployed missiles, unmanned aerial vehicles, and naval mines to attack commercial shipping interests in the Red Sea, threatening global freedom of navigation and the integrity of international commerce. The Houthis also profit significantly from the shipment of goods through ports they control, profiting, in particular, from the discharge of refined petroleum products.
“Today’s action underscores our commitment to disrupt the Houthis’ efforts to fund their dangerous and destabilizing attacks in the region,” said Deputy Secretary of the Treasury Michael Faulkender. “Treasury will continue to leverage our tools and authorities to target those who seek to enable the Houthis’ ability to exploit the people of Yemen and continue their campaign of violence.”
Today’s action is being taken pursuant to the counterterrorism authority, Executive Order (E.O.) 13224, as amended, and builds on OFAC’s numerous actions targeting Houthi leaders, revenue generation, financial facilitators, and suppliers. The U.S. Department of State designated the Houthis as a Specially Designated Global Terrorist (SDGT) on February 16, 2024, and subsequently re-designated the group as a Foreign Terrorist Organization (FTO) on March 4, 2025. Providing material support to the Houthis not only carries acute sanctions risk, but also exposes vessels and crew members to serious safety risk from potential Houthi attacks. Additionally, on April 16, 2025, OFAC issued an update to its previous guidance for shipping and maritime stakeholders on detecting and mitigating Iranian oil sanctions evasion.
REFINED PETROLEUM PRODUCT DELIVERIES TO HOUTHI-CONTROLLED PORTS
The Houthis control the strategic Red Sea ports of Hudaydah, Ras Isa, and Al-Salif, funneling millions of dollars derived from port revenue and the seizure of refined petroleum products imported through these ports to fund their reckless attack campaign against U.S. interests and those of our allies in the region. The group sells refined petroleum products delivered through these ports at exorbitant prices on Yemen’s black market, which enables Houthi operatives to purchase military materials, creates an artificial shortage of essential goods for average Yemenis, and fuels rampant corruption among Houthi leaders.
In conjunction with the re-designation of the Houthis as an FTO, OFAC amended two general licenses authorizing transactions related to the group and the sale of refined petroleum products. General license (GL) 25A wound down a previous authorization enabling the offloading of refined petroleum products in Yemen involving the Houthis, through April 4, 2025. GL 26A excludes refined petroleum products from goods that can be imported through ports and airports in Yemen involving Ansarallah. The vessels targeted today discharged refined petroleum products at Houthi-controlled ports after the expiration of the OFAC general license on April 4, 2025.
Marshall Islands-registered Zaas Shipping & Trading Co (Zaas Shipping) facilitated the delivery of Liquid Petroleum Gas (LPG) to the Houthi-controlled port of Ras Isa using the San Marino-flagged Tulip BZ. The Tulip BZ finished discharging its cargo and departed Ras Isa on April 10, six days after the expiration of OFAC’s GL 25A. The Tulip BZ has also been used to transport petroleum products on behalf of Iran. Operating under its former name, Gas Line, the Tulip BZ vessel was used to transport petrochemical products on behalf of the Iranian Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC), which is designated pursuant to E.O. 13224. OFAC designated the IRGC pursuant to E.O. 13224, as amended, on October 13, 2017, for its activities in support of the IRGC-Qods Force, which was designated pursuant to E.O. 13224 on October 25, 2007, for providing support to a number of terrorist organizations.
Mauritius-registered Bagsak Shipping Inc facilitated the delivery of gas oil to the Houthi-controlled port of Ras Isa using the Panama-flagged Maisan. The Maisan finished discharging its cargo and departed Ras Isa on April 8, four days after the expiration of OFAC’s GL 25A. The Maisan has also been involved in the export of Russian crude oil and petroleum products from Russian ports since February 2023. The Maisan was previously managed by a company which was one of the top players in the shadow tanker fleet involved in the export of Russian crude oil and petroleum products in the face of western sanctions.
Marshall Islands-registered Great Success Shipping Co (Great Success) facilitated the delivery of gas oil to the Houthi-controlled port of Ras Isa using the Panama-flagged White Whale. The White Whale finished discharging its cargo and departed Ras Isa on April 17, thirteen days after the expiration of OFAC’s GL 25A.
Zaas Shipping, Bagsak Shipping Inc, and Great Success are being designated pursuant to E.O. 13224, as amended, for having materially assisted, sponsored, or provided financial, material, or technological support for, or goods or services to or in support of, the Houthis.
Tulip BZ is being identified as property in which Zaas Shipping has an interest.
Maisan is being identified as property in which Bagsak Shipping Inc has an interest.
White Whale is being identified as property in which Great Success Shipping Co has an interest.
PREVIOUSLY IDENTIFIED VESSELS DELIVERING REFINED PETROLEUM PRODUCTS TO HOUTHIS
The Clipper, which was identified as blocked property in December 2022 pursuant to E.O. 13224 under its former name, Queen Luca, for ties to an Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps-Qods Force (IRGC-QF) sanctions evasion network, continues to operate, despite its designated-status, and transported Iranian oil and a recent shipment of butane and propane destined for Houthi-controlled areas of Yemen. The IRGC-QF was designated pursuant to E.O. 13224 on October 25, 2007, for providing support to a number of terrorist organizations.
The Akoya Gas, which was identified as blocked property in September 2022 pursuant to E.O. 13846 under its former name, Gas Allure, for involvement in Iranian petrochemicals and petroleum sales, and in mid-April 2025 was at berth in a Houthi-controlled port in Yemen.
SANCTIONS IMPLICATIONS
As a result of today’s action, all property and interests in property of the designated persons described above that are in the United States or in the possession or control of U.S. persons are blocked and must be reported to OFAC. In addition, any entities that are owned, directly or indirectly, individually or in the aggregate, 50 percent or more by one or more blocked persons are also blocked. Unless authorized by a general or specific license issued by OFAC, or exempt, OFAC’s regulations generally prohibit all transactions by U.S. persons or within (or transiting) the United States that involve any property or interests in property of designated or otherwise blocked persons.
Violations of U.S. sanctions may result in the imposition of civil or criminal penalties on U.S. and foreign persons. OFAC may impose civil penalties for sanctions violations on a strict liability basis. OFAC’s Economic Sanctions Enforcement Guidelines provide more information regarding OFAC’s enforcement of U.S. economic sanctions. In addition, financial institutions and other persons may risk exposure to sanctions for engaging in certain transactions or activities with designated entities or otherwise blocked persons. The prohibitions include the making of any contribution or provision of funds, goods, or services by, to, or for the benefit of any designated person, or the receipt of any contribution or provision of funds, goods, or services from any such person.
Furthermore, engaging in certain transactions with the entities designated today entails risk of secondary sanctions pursuant to E.O. 13224, as amended. Pursuant to this authority, OFAC can prohibit or impose strict conditions on opening or maintaining, in the United States, a correspondent account or a payable-through account of a foreign financial institution that knowingly conducts or facilitates any significant transaction on behalf of a Specially Designated Global Terrorist.
Exports, reexports, or transfers of items subject to U.S. export controls involving persons included on the Specially Designated Nationals and Blocked Persons (SDN) List pursuant to E.O. 13224, as amended, may be subject to additional restrictions administered by the Department of Commerce, Bureau of Industry and Security. See 15 C.F.R. section 744.8 for additional information
The power and integrity of OFAC sanctions derive not only from OFAC’s ability to designate and add persons to the SDN List, but also from its willingness to remove persons from the SDN List consistent with the law. The ultimate goal of sanctions is not to punish, but to bring about a positive change in behavior. For information concerning the process for seeking removal from an OFAC list, including the SDN List, please refer to OFAC’s Frequently Asked Question 897 here, and to submit a request for removal, click here.
Click here for more information on the entities designated and vessels identified today.
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