U.S. Department of the Treasury

DATE: July 16, 2024

SUBJECT: Department of the Treasury Pass-Through Program

1. PURPOSE. This Directive establishes a Department of the Treasury (Treasury) Pass-Through Program in accordance with Department of State’s Foreign Affairs Manual, 12 FAM 263.3-2, Critical Human Intelligence (HUMINT) Threat Posts.
2. SCOPE. This Treasury Directive applies to all bureaus, offices, and organizations of Treasury, including the Offices of Inspector General, as well as any non-Treasury entity that receives security support services from Treasury, who assign personnel to overseas locations (e.g., the Office of International Affairs (IA), the Office of Terrorist Financing & Financial Crimes (TFFC), the Office of Technical Assistance (OTA), and the Internal Revenue Service (IRS)) (collectively “Covered Entities”). The provisions of this Directive shall not be construed to interfere with or impede the authorities or independence of the Offices of Inspector General.
3. POLICY. In accordance with 12 FAM 263.3-2, all employees, contractors, and TDY personnel of covered entities who seek assignment for more than 60 calendar days accumulated in one year (not necessarily consecutive) to any Critical HUMINT threat post shall undergo Pass-Through Program review prior to formal selection for and acceptance of such assignment. Failure to properly screen an employee or contractor could result in disapproval for assignment to, or expulsion from, the Critical HUMINT threat post.
4. RESPONSIBILITIES.
   1. The Deputy Assistant Secretary (DAS) for Security and Counterintelligence (S&CI) or their designee shall oversee the Pass-Through Program.
   2. Treasury’s S&CI Directorate is responsible for conducting the Pass-Through Program review, using security and suitability factors to evaluate the degree of heightened threat for assignment in a specific Critical HUMINT threat post and to identify any personal vulnerability potentially subject to HUMINT exploitation should the assignment be approved.
   3. Heads of covered entities are responsible for ensuring affected employees, contractors, and TDY personnel are submitted for Pass-Through Program review in advance of assignment to a Critical HUMINT threat post.
5. PASS-THROUGH PROGRAM REVIEW PROCEDURES.
   1. To provide as much advance notice as possible, all covered entities must submit all candidates selected to interview for a posting outside the contiguous United States (OCONUS) to the Office of Security Programs (OSP), Personnel Security Branch, for Pass-Through Program review.
   2. OSP will conduct an initial review of the candidate’s personnel file in accordance with the Department of State’s Foreign Affairs Handbook (FAH), 12 FAH-6 H-211, and the evaluation factors listed below in paragraph 6.
      1. 1) If OSP’s review identifies potential counterintelligence (CI) concerns, OSP will forward the personnel file to the Office of Counterintelligence (OCI) via secure messaging requesting a CI review in support of the Pass-Through Program. OCI will proceed as set forth in paragraph 5.c. below. If there are no potential CI concerns, OSP will not forward the personnel file to OCI.
      2. 2) If OSP’s review identifies non-CI personnel security concerns, OSP will prepare a justification/mitigation plan identifying the personnel security concerns and detailing any recommendations for mitigation (if applicable). OSP will then transmit the justification/mitigation plan to the sponsoring Treasury component and the Office of Human Resources (OHR).
      3. 3) If OSP’s review does not identify any CI or personnel security concerns, OSP will notify the sponsoring Treasury component and OHR of the review results via memorandum.
   3. When there are potential CI concerns, and upon receipt of the personnel file from OSP, OCI will conduct a review and prepare a justification/mitigation plan identifying the CI concerns and detailing any recommendations for mitigation (if applicable). OSP will then transmit the justification/mitigation plan to the sponsoring Treasury component and OHR.
   4. When the OSP and OCI reviews identify both personnel security and counterintelligence concerns, OSP will prepare a single justification/mitigation plan in coordination with OCI that identifies all concerns and details any recommendations for mitigation (if applicable). OSP will then transmit the justification/mitigation plan to the sponsoring Treasury component and OHR.
   5. If either OSP or OCI objects (in each respective case, the “Objecting Office”) to a proposed assignment because the risk is too high and there are no potential mitigation measures that can be applied, the Objecting Office will provide a memorandum detailing the objection to the assignment (the “Assignment Objection”) to the DAS for S&CI or their designee. The DAS for S&CI or their designee will either concur or non-concur with the Assignment Objection.
   6. If the DAS for S&CI or their designee non-concurs with the Assignment Objection, the Objecting Office will revise the justification/mitigation plan accordingly.
   7. If the DAS for S&CI or their designee concurs with the Assignment Objection, the Assignment Objection is presented to the sponsoring Treasury component and OHR. OHR retains final authority on the proposed assignment.
   8. An assignment objection by itself is not a reason to revoke an individual’s security clearance or accesses. Candidates that receive an assignment objection to a specific Critical HUMINT threat post are not barred from obtaining an OCONUS position in the future. Should the candidate subsequently be submitted for assignment for either the same Critical HUMINT threat post or another Critical HUMINT threat post, another Pass-Through Program review will be conducted based on the current facts and circumstances.
6. EVALUATION FACTORS. Treasury’s Pass-Through Program review is a 13-point evaluation of a candidate’s circumstances. The 13 criteria against which a candidate is evaluated under the Pass-Through Program include the following:
   1. Whether the candidate or an immediate family member has an immediate family member still residing in the proposed Critical HUMINT threat country;
   2. Whether the candidate or an immediate family member has other family ties in any Critical HUMINT threat post where a foreign intelligence entity (FIE) could exploit familial bonds of affection;
   3. Whether the candidate has a family member currently or recently employed by the Critical HUMINT threat country’s military armed forces, intelligence or security service, police service, or ministry of foreign affairs;
   4. Whether the candidate has a history of poor security practices that are recent and of a serious nature;
   5. Whether the candidate is or has been a known target of interest to a FIE;
   6. Whether the candidate has a history of atypical behavior such as drug or alcohol abuse or criminal misconduct;
   7. Whether the candidate has demonstrated emotional instability (as determined by a medical professional);
   8. Whether the candidate has exhibited financial or fiscal management irresponsibility that interferes with their performance of duty;
   9. Whether a past investigation concerning the candidate documents a serious allegation concerning misconduct, suitability, or professional ethics that could be exploited by a FIE;
   10. Whether the candidate has had more than one previous assignment to the same Critical HUMINT threat post;
   11. Whether the candidate has made an unauthorized disclosure of sensitive or classified information;
   12. Whether the candidate or a close family member has demonstrated loyalty to the proposed Critical HUMINT threat country of assignment (i.e., previously employed with the FIE or ministry of foreign affairs);
   13. Whether the candidate has had romantic involvement with a citizen of the proposed Critical HUMINT threat country of assignment.
7. AUTHORITIES.
   1. Executive Order 12333, as amended, “United States Intelligence Activities”;
   2. Executive Order 12968, as amended, “Access to Classified Information”;
   3. Executive Order 13587, “Structural Reforms to Improve the Security of Classified Networks and the Responsible Sharing and Safeguarding of Classified Information”;
   4. Title 50, U.S. Code, Section 3381 (Section 811, Intelligence Authorization Act for FY 1995);
   5. 12 FAM 263.3-2 Critical Human Intelligence-Threat Posts
8. OFFICES OF PRIMARY INTEREST. Office of the Assistant Secretary for Intelligence and Analysis, Office of the DAS for Security and Counterintelligence, Office of Counterintelligence, and Office of Security Programs.