WASHINGTON — Today, the Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) sanctioned a dozen individuals and entities based in multiple jurisdictions, including the head of the Houthi-aligned Central Bank of Yemen branch in Sana’a, for their roles in trafficking arms, laundering money, and shipping illicit Iranian petroleum for the benefit of the Houthis. Among the persons designated today are key smuggling operatives, arms traffickers, and shipping and financial facilitators who have enabled the Houthis to acquire and transport an array of dual-use and weapons components, as well as generate revenue to support their destabilizing regional activities. Additionally, OFAC identified five cryptocurrency wallets associated with Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps-Qods Force (IRGC-QF)-backed Houthi financial official Sa’id al-Jamal (al-Jamal), who operates under the aliases “Khrpi,” “Ahmad Sa’idi,” and “Hisham,” among others.
“Today’s action underscores our commitment to leveraging all our tools to disrupt the Houthis’ efforts to acquire weapons, procure dual-use components, and secure additional revenue,” said Acting Under Secretary of the Treasury for Terrorism and Financial Intelligence Bradley T. Smith. “The United States will continue to expose these schemes and will hold accountable those who seek to enable the Houthis’ destabilizing activities.”
Today’s action is being taken pursuant to the counterterrorism authority, Executive Order (E.O.) 13224, as amended. The U.S. Department of State’s designation of Ansarallah (commonly known as the Houthis) as a Specially Designated Global Terrorist (SDGT), pursuant to
E.O. 13224, as amended, became effective on February 16, 2024. OFAC designated al-Jamal pursuant to E.O. 13224, as amended, on June 10, 2021, for having materially assisted, sponsored, or provided financial, material, or technological support for, or goods or services to or in support of, the IRGC-QF. OFAC designated the IRGC-QF pursuant to E.O. 13224 on October 25, 2007, for providing material support to multiple terrorist groups.
Senior houthi financial officials AND EXCHANGE HOUSES
Hashem Ismail Ali Ahmad al-Madani (al-Madani), governor of the Houthi-aligned central bank in Sana’a, Yemen, serves as a key figure in the Houthi movement. Al-Madani is the primary overseer of funds sent to the Houthis from the IRGC-QF and has cooperated with IRGC-QF-backed Houthi financial official al-Jamal to conduct business activities for the benefit of the Houthis.
Ahmed Muhammad Muhammad Hasan al-Hadi (al-Hadi) is a senior Houthi financial official who coordinates and facilitates the movement of Houthi funds on the group’s behalf. Al-Hadi has ordered other Houthi financial officials, including al-Jamal, to move funds for the group and tasks them with disbursing funds to Houthi officials and other individuals in Yemen.
Al-Madani is being designated pursuant to E.O. 13224, as amended, for having acted or purported to act for or on behalf of, directly or indirectly, the Houthis. Al-Hadi is being designated pursuant to E.O. 13224, as amended, for having materially assisted, sponsored, or provided financial, material, or technological support for, or goods or services to or in support of, the Houthis.
The Houthis have used Sana’a-based money services businesses under their control to move large sums and circumvent sanctions. Mohammed Ali Al Thawr Exchange (Al Thawr Exchange), under the supervision of U.S.-designated Houthi finance official Abdullah al-Jamal, has brought millions of dollars on behalf of the al-Jamal network into Yemen to enable money laundering operations with the IRGC-QF. Similarly, Khaled Al Hazmi and Brother Company General Partnership (Al Hazmi Exchange) transferred funds to U.S.-designated, al-Jamal-controlled Davos Exchange and Remittances Company (Davos Exchange) in early 2024 to cover Davos Exchange’s sanctioned assets and help the al-Jamal network circumvent sanctions.
Al Thawr Exchange and Al Hazmi Exchange are being designated pursuant to E.O. 13224, as amended, for having materially assisted, sponsored, or provided financial, material, or technological support for, or goods or services to or in support of, al-Jamal.
In addition to using money services businesses to access funding abroad, al-Jamal’s network has also used cryptocurrency to circumvent sanctions. Today, OFAC has added five wallet addresses used by al-Jamal and his network to the Specially Designated Nationals and Blocked Persons List (SDN List) to disrupt these financial flows.
HOUTHI Weapons Smuggling Operatives and Shipping Facilitator
Houthi operatives located in Yemen and the People’s Republic of China (PRC) play crucial roles in facilitating the movement of weapons and dual-use components into Yemen. Yemen-based Wail Muhammad Said Abd-al-Wadud (Al-Wadud) is a Houthi logistics official who has been involved in facilitating Houthi smuggling operations. Umar Ahmad Umar Ahmad Hajj (Umar) is a Houthi logistics official who, alongside Al-Wadud, has facilitated Houthi smuggling activities through Somalia.
Houthi procurement operatives leverage an array of shipping firms with offices in Yemen and the PRC to transport illicit procurements to Houthi fighters. One such firm, Safwan Al-Dubai Company of Shipping and Trade (Safwan Al-Dubai), is a Yemen-based shipping and logistics company that Houthi procurement officials have used to import dual-use items and other weapons components into Yemen. Safwan Al-Dubai maintains a presence in the PRC, which it likely uses to obfuscate weapons shipments to Houthi forces.
Al-Wadud and Umar are being designated pursuant to E.O. 13224, as amended, for having acted or purported to act for or on behalf of, directly or indirectly, the Houthis. Safwan Al-Dubai is being designated pursuant to E.O. 13224, as amended, for having materially assisted, sponsored, or provided financial, material, or technological support for, or goods or services to or in support of, the Houthis.
HOUTHI ILLICIT SHIPPING FACILITATORS
Al-Jamal generates revenue for the Houthis through the illicit sale of Iranian petroleum to customers in East Asia. Al-Jamal’s oil shipments are enabled by a network of shipping firms in Malaysia that provide critical services to ships transporting this cargo. Malaysia-based companies Blu Shipping (M) SDN BHD (Blu Shipping) and Tefcas Marine SDN BHD (Tefcas Marine) provided services to the U.S.-sanctioned vessel RENEEZ (IMO 9232450), which has transported tens of thousands of metric tons of Iranian commodities for al-Jamal’s network.
Merkur Energy Port Services SDN BHD (Merkur Energy) served as the port agent for another U.S.-designated vessel, the YORGOS (IMO 9150365), which has also transported Iranian commodities for al-Jamal’s network. Puvaneswaran Venayagamoorthy (Venayagamoorthy) is the sole owner and executive of Merkur Energy. Ezekial Kanniappan Jr (Kanniappan), who serves as Merkur Energy’s head of operations, assisted in providing services to the YORGOS.
SANCTIONS IMPLICATIONS
As a result of today’s action, all property and interests in property of these individuals and entities named above, and of any entities that are owned, directly or indirectly, 50 percent or more by them, individually, or with other blocked persons, that are in the United States or in the possession or control of U.S. persons must be blocked and reported to OFAC. OFAC’s regulations generally prohibit all dealings by U.S. persons or within the United States (including transactions transiting the United States) that involve any property or interests in property of designated or blocked persons. U.S. persons must comply with OFAC regulations, including all U.S. citizens and permanent resident aliens regardless of where they are located, all persons within the United States, and all U.S.-incorporated entities and their foreign branches. Non-U.S. persons are also subject to certain OFAC prohibitions. For example, non-U.S. persons are prohibited from causing or conspiring to cause U.S. persons to wittingly or unwittingly violate U.S. sanctions, as well as engaging in conduct that evades U.S. sanctions. Violations of OFAC regulations may result in civil or criminal penalties. OFAC may impose civil penalties for sanctions violations based on strict liability, meaning that a person subject to U.S. jurisdiction may be held civilly liable even if such person did not know or have reason to know that it was engaging in a transaction that was prohibited under sanctions laws and regulations administered by OFAC. OFAC’s Economic Sanctions Enforcement Guidelines provide more information regarding OFAC’s enforcement of U.S. economic sanctions, including the factors that OFAC generally considers when determining an appropriate response to an apparent violation. For additional information on complying with U.S. sanctions and export control laws, please see Department of Commerce, Department of the Treasury, and Department of Justice Tri-Seal Compliance Note.
Furthermore, engaging in certain transactions with the individuals designated today entails risk of secondary sanctions pursuant to E.O. 13224, as amended. Pursuant to this authority, OFAC can prohibit or impose strict conditions on the opening or maintaining in the United States of a correspondent account or a payable-through account of any foreign financial institution that knowingly conducted or facilitated any significant transaction on behalf of a Specially Designated Global Terrorist.
The power and integrity of OFAC sanctions derive not only from OFAC’s ability to designate and add persons to the SDN List, but also from its willingness to remove persons from the SDN List consistent with the law. The ultimate goal of sanctions is not to punish, but to bring about a positive change in behavior. For information concerning the process for seeking removal from an OFAC list, including the SDN List, please refer to OFAC’s Frequently Asked Question 897 here. For detailed information on the process to submit a request for removal from an OFAC sanctions list, please click here
Click here for more information on the individual and entities identified today.
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