WASHINGTON — Today, the Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) took action against a network of Houthi financial facilitators and procurement operatives working in coordination with Sa’id al-Jamal, a senior Houthi financial official backed by Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps-Qods Force (IRGC-QF). This network has procured tens of millions of dollars’ worth of commodities from Russia, including weapons and sensitive goods, as well as stolen Ukrainian grain, for onward shipment to Houthi-controlled Yemen. Additionally, OFAC has identified eight digital asset wallets used by the Houthis to transfer funds associated with their activities.
“The Houthis remain reliant on Sa’id al-Jamal and his network to procure critical goods to supply the group’s terrorist war machine,” said Secretary of the Treasury Scott Bessent. “Today’s action underscores our commitment to degrading the Houthis’ ability to threaten the region through their destabilizing activities.”
The Houthis have deployed missiles, unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), and naval mines to attack commercial shipping interests in the Red Sea, threatening global freedom of navigation and the integrity of international commerce. These indiscriminate attacks on civilian economic infrastructure, enabled and incentivized by the support of the Iranian regime, have resulted in the deaths of innocent civilians and resulted in millions of dollars in damage to commercial shipping.
Today’s action is being taken pursuant to the counterterrorism authority, Executive Order (E.O.) 13224, as amended. The U.S. Department of State’s designation of Ansarallah (commonly known as the Houthis) as a Specially Designated Global Terrorist (SDGT) pursuant to E.O. 13224, as amended, became effective on February 16, 2024. OFAC designated Sa’id al-Jamal pursuant to E.O. 13224, as amended, on June 10, 2021 for having materially assisted, sponsored, or provided financial, material, or technological support for, or goods or services to or in support of, the IRGC-QF. OFAC designated the IRGC-QF pursuant to E.O. 13224 on October 25, 2007 for providing material support to multiple terrorist groups.
HOUTHI PROCUREMENT NETWORK
Russia-based Afghan businessman Hushang Ghairat (Hushang) and his brother, Russia-based Afghan businessman Sohrab Ghairat (Sohrab) have assisted Sa’id al-Jamal with Houthi commercial initiatives in Russia, including arms procurement. In summer and fall 2024, Hushang and Sohrab, at Sa’id al-Jamal’s direction, orchestrated at least two shipments of stolen Ukrainian grain from Crimea to Yemen on board the Russia-flagged AM THESEUS (IMO: 9720263), also known as the ZAFAR.
Hong Kong-based AM Asia M6 Ltd is the registered owner, ship manager, and operator of the AM THESEUS. Russian national Vyacheslav Vladimirovich Vidanov (Vidanov) served as the captain of the AM THESEUS during some of the 2024 voyages between Crimea and Yemen, and Russian national Yuri Vladimirovich Belyakov (Belyakov) served as the vessel’s captain through the end of 2024.
Hushang, Sohrab, AM Asia M6 Ltd, Vidanov, and Belyakov are being designated pursuant to E.O. 13224, as amended, for having materially assisted, sponsored, or provided financial, material, or technological support for, or goods or services to or in support of, Sa’id al-Jamal. The AM THESEUS is being identified as blocked property in which AM Asia M6 Ltd has an interest.
Sohrab is the general director of three Russia-based companies: LLC Sky Frame, LLC Edison, and LLC Kolibri Group. LLC Sky Frame, LLC Edison, and LLC Kolibri Group are being designated pursuant to E.O. 13224, as amended, for being owned, controlled, or directed by, directly or indirectly, Sohrab.
HOUTHI MONEY LAUNDERING AND SHIPPING ACTIVITIES
Hushang, Sohrab, and Sa’id al-Jamal use financial facilitators to conduct financial transactions in support of the Houthis’ trade ventures involving Russia, including the aforementioned grain shipments. Turkiye-based Iranian money launderer Hassan Jafari (Jafari) has worked with Hushang and Sa’id al-Jamal to launder dollars on behalf of Sa’id al-Jamal’s network, enabling the network’s sanctions evasion schemes. Jafari also arranged payments worth millions of dollars in support of shipments benefiting the Houthis.
Jafari is being designated pursuant to E.O. 13224, as amended, for having materially assisted, sponsored, or provided financial, material, or technological support for, or goods or services to or in support of, Hushang.
SANCTIONS IMPLICATIONS
As a result of today’s action, all property and interests in property of the designated person(s) described above that are in the United States or in the possession or control of U.S. persons is/are blocked and must be reported to OFAC. In addition, any entities that are owned, directly or indirectly, individually or in the aggregate, 50 percent or more by one or more blocked persons are also blocked. Unless authorized by a general or specific license issued by OFAC or exempt, U.S. sanctions generally prohibit all transactions by U.S. persons or within (or transiting) the United States that involve any property or interests in property of designated or otherwise blocked persons.
Violations of U.S. sanctions may result in the imposition of civil or criminal penalties on U.S. and foreign persons. OFAC may impose civil penalties for sanctions violations on a strict liability basis. OFAC’s Economic Sanctions Enforcement Guidelines provide more information regarding OFAC’s enforcement of U.S. economic sanctions. In addition, financial institutions and other persons may risk exposure to sanctions for engaging in certain transactions or activities with designated or otherwise blocked persons.
Furthermore, engaging in certain transactions with the individuals designated today entails risk of secondary sanctions pursuant to E.O. 13224, as amended. Pursuant to this authority, OFAC can prohibit or impose strict conditions on opening or maintaining, in the United States, a correspondent account or a payable-through account of a foreign financial institution that knowingly conducts or facilitates any significant transaction on behalf of a Specially Designated Global Terrorist.
Exports, reexports, or transfers of items subject to U.S. export controls involving persons included on the SDN List pursuant to E.O. 13224, as amended, may be subject to additional restrictions administered by the Department of Commerce, Bureau of Industry and Security. See 15 C.F.R. section 744.8 for additional information.
The power and integrity of OFAC sanctions derive not only from OFAC’s ability to designate and add persons to the Specially Designated Nationals and Blocked Persons (SDN) List, but also from its willingness to remove persons from the SDN List consistent with the law. The ultimate goal of sanctions is not to punish, but to bring about a positive change in behavior. For information concerning the process for seeking removal from an OFAC list, including the SDN List, please refer to OFAC’s Frequently Asked Question 897 here and to submit a request for removal, click here.
View identifying information on the individuals and entities designated today.
###