Today’s Action Follows the September 27, 2025, Snapback of Previously Lifted United Nations Security Council Resolutions on Iran
WASHINGTON — Today, the U.S. Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) is designating 21 entities and 17 individuals involved in networks that facilitate the acquisition of sensitive goods and technology for Iran’s Ministry of Defense and Armed Forces Logistics (MODAFL), as well as its missile and military aircraft production efforts. These networks have assisted in activities including the procurement of technology for advanced surface-to-air missile systems and the illicit purchase of a U.S.-manufactured helicopter.
Iran’s ballistic missile and conventional weapons capabilities, supported by the networks designated today, pose a significant threat to U.S. service members in the Middle East, U.S. commercial ships transiting international waters, and civilians.
“The Iranian regime’s support of terrorist proxies and its pursuit of nuclear weapons threatens the security of the Middle East, the United States and our allies around the world,” said Secretary of the Treasury Scott Bessent. “Under President Trump’s leadership, we will deny the regime weapons it would use to further its malign objectives.”
Today’s action is in support of the September 27 reimposition of U.N. sanctions on Iran. All U.N. Member States are required to swiftly implement U.N. restrictions on Iran’s nuclear, missile, and other arms programs; including arms embargos, export controls, travel bans, asset freezes, and other restrictions on individuals and entities, including banks, involved in Iranian nuclear and missile activities. The so-called “snapback” of U.N. restrictions occurred as a direct result of Iran’s significant non-performance of its nuclear commitments under the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action. This Security Council decision demonstrates the international community’s aim of safeguarding the global nonproliferation regime against Iranian efforts to undermine it through threats and nuclear escalation.
IRANIAN MILITARY SUPPORT NETWORKs STRETCH MULTIPLE CONTINENTS
OFAC is targeting an Iran-based procurement network that acquires weapons components on behalf of MODAFL subsidiary, the Aerospace Industries Organization (AIO), and its subordinate entities, including the Shahid Bakeri Industrial Group (SBIG) — which is responsible for Iran’s solid‑fueled ballistic missile program. OFAC is also taking action against a procurement network largely based in Iran, Hong Kong, and China for their role in illicitly sourcing U.S.-origin, dual-use electronics for Shiraz Electronics Industries (SEI), a MODAFL-controlled entity that produces equipment for the Iranian military, including radars and missile guidance technology for surface-to-air missile defense systems, a current vulnerability for Iran following the 12-Day War.
OFAC is also targeting another network operating out of Iran, Germany, Türkiye, Portugal, and Uruguay that is procuring equipment, including a U.S.-origin helicopter, for the MODAFL subsidiary, Iran Helicopter Support and Renewal Company (PANHA). PANHA is an Iranian helicopter manufacturer and maintenance provider that has built and overhauled helicopters, including models originally manufactured in the United States, for Iran’s IRGC.
Treasury, state, dhs, and fbi are dismantling IRANIAN SUPPORT NETWORKS
OFAC worked extensively on this action with the Department of State, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI).
“Homeland Security Investigations (HSI) Chicago is proud to have played a critical role in identifying key members of the Iran-based procurement network designated today, which has enabled Iran’s ballistic missile program and posed a significant threat to U.S. and global security. This action underscores HSI’s commitment to protecting national security and dismantling illicit supply chains that threaten international stability,” said HSI Chicago Special Agent in Charge Matthew J. Scarpino.
“The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) alongside our federal partners will remain relentless in preventing weapons and dangerous assets from falling into the hands of foreign and domestic adversaries,” said Reuben Coleman, Acting Special Agent in Charge of the FBI Detroit Field Office. “I want to thank the dedicated members from our FBI Detroit Field Office, in close partnership with the U.S. Department of the Treasury – OFAC, for their tireless efforts in safeguarding our nation and protecting the American people from those who pose a threat to our nation.”
Today’s action by Treasury is being taken in furtherance of National Security Presidential Memorandum 2, which directs the U.S. government to curtail Iran’s ballistic missile program, counter Iran’s development of other asymmetric and conventional weapons capabilities, deny Iran a nuclear weapon, and deny the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) access to assets and resources that sustain their destabilizing activities.
Concurrent with the OFAC designations, the State Department is imposing sanctions on five Iranian individuals and one Iranian entity pursuant to E.O. 13382 for engaging in activities that materially contribute to or pose a risk of materially contributing to the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction by Iran.
OFAC is taking this action pursuant to Executive Order (E.O.) 13382, which targets proliferators of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and their means of delivery. AIO and SBIG were included in the Annex to E.O. 13382 as blocked persons, and the U.S. Department of State designated MODAFL and the IRGC pursuant to E.O. 13382 in October 2007 in connection with Iran’s ballistic missile program. OFAC designated SEI pursuant to E.O. 13382 on September 17, 2008 for being owned or controlled by MODAFL. On January 12, 2018, OFAC designated PANHA pursuant to E.O. 13382 for being owned or controlled by Iran Aviation Industries Organization (IAIO), which OFAC designated pursuant to E.O. 13382 on December 12, 2013 for being owned or controlled by MODAFL.
TARGETING IRAN’S MISSILE PROGRAM AND component PROCUREMENT
OFAC is moving against, Beh Joule Pars Commercial Engineering Company (Beh Joule Pars), an advanced conventional weapons procurement and sales conglomerate, in coordination with DHS and the State Department. Since 2017, HSI Chicago has spearheaded efforts to develop a thorough comprehension of the network and how it operates to procure sensitive technology in circumvention of sanctions.
Beh Joule Pars operates a network of companies to acquire military and sensitive, dual-use items on behalf of Iran’s military-industrial complex. Beh Joule Pars has procured or coordinated the procurement of accelerometers, gyroscopes, and microelectromechanical systems (MEMS) components for AIO subordinate entities including SBIG and the Shahid Hemmat Space Group (SHSG). Accelerometers and gyroscopes are guidance, navigation, and control equipment that Iran has sought for its ballistic missile and unmanned aerial vehicle programs, and MEMS components are electronics that Iran has sought for its ballistic missile program. Beh Joule Pars has also conducted outreach to indigenize the production of gyroscopes in Iran. SHSG was created by AIO in mid-2022, at which time former AIO Space Group Director Sayyed Ahmad Hoseini Munes (Hoseini Munes) became the director of SHSG.
Beh Joule Pars is being designated pursuant to E.O. 13382 for having provided, or attempted to provide, financial, material, technological or other support for, or goods or services in support of, AIO. SHSG is being designated pursuant to E.O. 13382 for being owned or controlled by, or acting or purporting to act for or on behalf of, directly or indirectly, AIO. Hoseini Munes is being designated pursuant to E.O. 13382 for being owned or controlled by, or acting or purporting to act for or on behalf of, directly or indirectly, SHSG.
Mehdi Farshchi (Farshchi) manages the Beh Joule Pars office in Tehran, and Mehdi Nili Ahmadabadi (Nili Ahmadabadi) manages the Beh Joule Pars office in Isfahan. Farshchi and Nili Ahmadabadi are the cofounders, joint owners, and main decision makers of Beh Joule Pars, and Nili Ahmadabadi also serves as a member of the board of directors for the company. Alireza Shafiian Azarkhavarani (Alireza Shafiian) has served as the chairman of the board of directors for Beh Joule Pars, and Fatemeh Shafiian Azarkhavarani (Fatemeh Shafiian) has served as the managing director and vice chairwoman of the board of directors for Beh Joule Pars.
Farshchi and Nili Ahmadabadi are being designated pursuant to E.O. 13382 for being owned or controlled by, or acting or purporting to act for or on behalf of, directly or indirectly, Beh Joule Pars. Alireza Shafiian and Fatemeh Shafiian are being designated pursuant to E.O. 13382 for having provided, or attempted to provide, financial, material, technological or other support for, or goods or services in support of, Beh Joule Pars.
Figure 1: Nili Ahmadabadi, Beh Joule Pars Tehran Office
Figure 2: Farshchi, Beh Joule Pars Isfahan Office
Abzar-e Daghigh-e Taha Company (Taha Company) has procured gyroscopes and provided services to SBIG. Farshchi serves as the managing director and a member of the board of directors for Taha Company. Tamin Sanat Amen Company (Amen Company) is a subordinate of Beh Joule Pars that is controlled by Beh Joule Pars and is involved in procurement for the oil, gas, petrochemical, and steel sectors. Farshchi serves as the managing director, executive director, and vice chairman of the board of directors for Amen Company, and Alireza Shafiian serves as a member of the board of directors for Amen Company. Takta Fanavaran Rasa Company (Rasa Company) is a subordinate of Beh Joule Pars that is involved in the construction and production sectors and has provided services to Beh Joule Pars. Nili Ahmadabadi serves as the chairman of the board of directors for Rasa Company, and Farshchi serves as the vice chairman of the board of directors for Rasa Company.
Taha Company is being designated pursuant to E.O. 13382 for having provided, or attempted to provide, financial, material, technological or other support for, or goods or services in support of, SBIG. Amen Company is being designated pursuant to E.O. 13382 for being owned or controlled by, or acting or purporting to act for or on behalf of, directly or indirectly, Beh Joule Pars. Rasa Company is being designated pursuant to E.O. 13382 for having provided, or attempted to provide, financial, material, technological or other support for, or goods or services in support of, Beh Joule Pars.
TARGETING SEI PROCUREMENT and defense projects
Iran-based Khazra Communications Technology Solutions (Khazra) is a defense contractor for SEI that has sourced U.S.-origin items, including printed circuit boards (PCBs), for SEI’s air defense radar systems. Iranian national Gholamhasan Heidari (Heidari) is the chief executive officer and chairman of the board of Khazra and has supported various Iranian military projects on behalf of Khazra, including long-range missiles and air defense radar systems. Iranian national Mohamadreza Dehghan Farsi (Farsi) is a Khazra employee who has worked closely with Heidari and coordinated Khazra’s procurement of U.S.-origin, dual-use electronic components for ultimate integration into Iranian air defense and radar systems, including the Meraj-series of radars used in advanced Iranian surface-to-air missile systems.
Khazra is being designated pursuant to E.O. 13382 for having provided or attempted to provide, financial, material, technological or other support for, or goods or services in support of, SEI. Heidari and Farsi are being designated pursuant to E.O. 13382 for being owned or controlled by, or acting or purporting to act for or on behalf of, directly or indirectly, Khazra.
Figure 3: Bavar-373 Long Range Surface-to-Air Missile System, which incorporates SEI’s Meraj-4 S-band Active Electronically Scanned Array Radar
Khazra relies on multiple witting China-based accomplices to procure dual-use components, including multiple front companies associated with Chinese national and prolific procurement agent for Iran’s defense industry, Liu Baoxia (a.k.a. Emily Liu). Khazra’s ties to Emily Liu go back as early as 2014. OFAC designated Emily Liu on July 18, 2017 for having provided, or attempted to provide, financial, material, technological or other support for, or goods or services in support of, SEI. Emily Liu is wanted by the FBI for alleged involvement in a years-long conspiracy to unlawfully export and smuggle U.S.-origin electronic components from the United States to Iran.
China-based Westcom Technology Co Limited (Westcom) and Hong Kong-based Innovia Electronic Technology Co Limited (Innovia) are companies used by Emily Liu to procure electronic components, ultimately intended for use in Iranian missile and radar systems, for Khazra. Emily Liu and her colleagues have used bank accounts held by Emily Liu’s sister, China‑based Liu Baojuan, as cover for their financial transactions. In addition, Liu Baojuan has served as director and sole shareholder of multiple Hong Kong-registered companies involved in Emily Liu’s procurement operations, including Hong Kong-based Longstone Technology Co Limited (Longstone), Raybeam Optronics Co., Ltd. (Raybeam), and Raytronic Corporation, Limited (Raytronic). On July 18, 2017, OFAC designated Raybeam pursuant to E.O. 13382 for being owned or controlled by Emily Liu, and OFAC designated Raytronic for having provided, or attempted to provide, financial, material, technological or other support for, or goods or services in support of, Emily Liu. Chinese national Sun Zhaolan (Sun) is Emily Liu’s mother and serves as the legal representative, manager, and executive director of Westcom. As early as 2015, Emily Liu and her associates have used Sun’s bank account to conduct transactions with Iran-based entities.
Westcom is being designated pursuant to E.O. 13382 for having provided, or attempted to provide, financial, material, technological or other support for, or goods or services in support of, Khazra. Innovia and Liu Baojuan are being designated pursuant to E.O. 13382 for having provided, or attempted to provide, financial, material, technological or other support for, or goods or services in support of, Emily Liu. Longstone is being designated pursuant to E.O. 13382 for being owned or controlled by, or acting or purporting to act for or on behalf of, directly or indirectly, Liu Baojuan. Sun is being designated pursuant to E.O. 13382 for being owned or controlled by, or acting or purporting to act for or on behalf of, directly or indirectly, Westcom.
Westcom shares the same Beijing-based address as Excellent Beijing Technology Development Company Limited (Excellent Beijing), a company for which OFAC-designated Iranian national Mohsen Parsajam (Parsajam) serves as legal representative, general manager, executive director, and sole shareholder. Parsajam is the chairman of the board of Iran-based, OFAC-designated Rayan Roshd Afzar Company (Rayan Roshd) and has had a longstanding affiliation with Emily Liu, including serving as board member, executive, and shareholder of multiple companies that have been used as fronts within Emily Liu’s procurement network. Parsajam also serves as the managing director and chairman of Iran-based Rayan Fan Kav Andish Co (Rayan Fan Group), a holding company for a variety of firms that operate in the field of high technology systems and have produced technical components for the IRGC’s aerospace program. OFAC designated Rayan Roshd pursuant to E.O. 13382 on July 18, 2017 for having provided, or attempted to provide, financial, material, technological or other support for, or goods or services in support of, the IRGC. OFAC designated Parsajam on July 18, 2017 for acting or purporting to act for or on behalf of, directly or indirectly, Rayan Roshd. OFAC designated the Rayan Fan Group pursuant to E.O. 13382 on May 31, 2024 for being owned or controlled by, or acting or purporting to act for or on behalf of, directly or indirectly, Parsajam.
Chinese national Cai Deshan (Cai), a sales manager of Raybeam, acts as the legal representative and executive director of China-based companies Hebei Senning Automated Equipment Co Ltd (Hebei Senning) and OFAC-designated Futech Co Ltd (Futech). Hebei Senning has made multiple shipments of materials to Rayan Fan Group and its subsidiaries while operating under the trade name “Sunny International Co Ltd.” OFAC previously designated Futech on June 20, 2025 pursuant to E.O. 13382 for having provided, or attempted to provide, financial, material, technological or other support for, or goods or services in support of, Rayan Fan Group. Chinese national, Hou Xueyuan (Hou), Emily Liu’s brother-in-law, serves as the director of Innovia and manages its affairs. Hou is also the director and sole shareholder of Hong Kong-based Micro Device Co Limited (Micro Device).
Excellent Beijing is being designated pursuant to E.O. 13382 for being owned or controlled by, or acting or purporting to act for or on behalf of, directly or indirectly, Parsajam. Cai is being designated pursuant to E.O. 13382 for being or owned or controlled by, or acting or purporting to act for or on behalf of, directly or indirectly, Futech. Hebei Senning is being designated pursuant to E.O. 13382 for having provided, or attempted to provide, financial, material, technological or other support for, or goods or services in support of, Rayan Fan Group. Hou is being designated pursuant to E.O. 13382 for being owned or controlled by, or acting or purporting to act for or on behalf of, directly or indirectly, Innovia. Micro Device is being designated pursuant to E.O. 13382 for being owned or controlled by, or acting or purporting to act for or on behalf of, directly or indirectly, Hou.
Farsi and Khazra have worked closely with witting China-based PCB distributors Rayming Technology (Rayming), Hangzhou Jiepei Information Technology Co Ltd (Hangzhou Jiepei), Rocket PCB Solution Ltd (Rocket PCB), and UIY Inc (UIY) to coordinate sourcing, payment, and shipment of components. Khazra’s procurement scheme relied on the witting participation by Chinese nationals, including Lei Guojian (Lei), the manager and director of Rayming, and Hu Yunlu (Hu), a Rocket PCB account manager who has coordinated Rocket PCB’s sales to Khazra. To circumvent export controls, Khazra employee Farsi instructed employees of the PCB distributors to submit false documentation obfuscating the true value and contents of shipments.
Rayming and Hangzhou Jiepei are being designated pursuant to E.O. 13382 for having provided, or attempted to provide, financial, material, technological or other support for, or goods or services in support of, Farsi. UIY and Rocket PCB are being designated pursuant to E.O. 13382 for having provided, or attempted to provide, financial, material, technological or other support for, or goods or services in support of, Khazra. Lei is being designated pursuant to E.O. 13382 for being owned or controlled by, or acting or purporting to act for or on behalf of, directly or indirectly, Rayming. Hu is being designated pursuant to E.O. 13382 for having provided, or attempted to provide, financial, material, technological or other support for, or goods or services in support of, Rocket PCB.
TARGETING IRANIAN MILITARY AIRCRAFT PROCUREMENT
OFAC is also targeting a transnational procurement network supporting Iran’s military aircraft production with the support of the FBI. Iranian helicopter manufacturer and maintenance provider PANHA produces helicopters for the IRGC such as the Shahed 278 civilian Bell helicopter clone and the Shahed 285 military Bell helicopter clone.
Iran-based Pasargad Helicopter Company (PHC) is a helicopter leasing and flying company that provides services in procuring helicopters and spare parts for PANHA. Under the direction of PHC’s Iran- and Germany-based chief executive officer (CEO), Mehdi Shirazi Shayesteh (Shayesteh), PHC was in communication with PANHA, received numerous requests for helicopters and spare parts, and used a transnational procurement network to procure these items for PANHA.
From 2022 through 2023, Germany-based Star Management Group GmbH (SMG) supplied a helicopter part to PHC and supported PHC in a scheme using intermediaries to supply actuators to PANHA. In his role as the director of SMG, Germany-based Seyed Behzad Bouzary (Bouzary) was included on an invoice in connection with the scheme to supply helicopter parts to PANHA. Türkiye-based Cabuk Calisan Tasimacilik Ve Endustri Makineleri Ticaret Limited Sirketi (CCT) attempted to provide helicopter parts to PHC and entered into a contract with PHC relating to the supply of helicopter parts.
Portugal-based Business United Unipessoal LDA (United Business) sold or attempted to sell helicopter parts to PHC, and, working with Shayesteh, purchased a U.S.-origin helicopter worth nearly 4 million euros on behalf of PHC. Portugal-based Antonio Filipe Fortio Mira (Mira) is the founder, managing director, and sole owner of United Business. In his role, Mira signed off on the sale of helicopter parts to PHC. Uruguay-based Perfect Day Co SA (Perfect Day) also sold or attempted to sell helicopter parts to PHC for end-use by PANHA. As CEO of Perfect Day, Iran‑based Amirhossein Salimi (Salimi) signed proforma invoices from Perfect Day to PANHA and PHC for helicopter parts totaling tens of thousands of dollars in value.
PHC is being designated pursuant to E.O. 13382 for having provided, or having attempted to provide, financial, material, technological or other support for, or goods or services in support of, PANHA. Shayesteh is being designated pursuant to E.O. 13382 for being owned or controlled by, or acting or purporting to act for or on behalf of, directly or indirectly, PHC. SMG, CCT, United Business, and Perfect Day are being designated pursuant to E.O. 13382 for having provided, or attempted to provide, financial, material, technological or other support for, or goods or services in support of, PHC. Bouzary is being designated pursuant to E.O. 13382 for being owned or controlled by, or acting or purporting to act for or on behalf of, directly or indirectly, SMG. Mira is being designated pursuant to E.O. 13382 for being owned or controlled by, or acting or purporting to act for or on behalf of, directly or indirectly, United Business. Salimi is being designated pursuant to E.O. 13382 for being owned or controlled by, or acting or purporting to act for or on behalf of, directly or indirectly, Perfect Day.
SANCTIONS IMPLICATIONS
As a result of today’s action, all property and interests in property of the designated or blocked persons described above that are in the United States or in the possession or control of U.S. persons are blocked and must be reported to OFAC. In addition, any entities that are owned, directly or indirectly, individually or in the aggregate, 50 percent or more by one or more blocked persons are also blocked. Unless authorized by a general or specific license issued by OFAC, or exempt, OFAC’s regulations generally prohibit all transactions by U.S. persons or within (or transiting) the United States that involve any property or interests in property of blocked persons.
Violations of U.S. sanctions may result in the imposition of civil or criminal penalties on U.S. and foreign persons. OFAC may impose civil penalties for sanctions violations on a strict liability basis. OFAC’s Economic Sanctions Enforcement Guidelines provide more information regarding OFAC’s enforcement of U.S. economic sanctions. In addition, financial institutions and other persons may risk exposure to sanctions for engaging in certain transactions or activities with designated or otherwise blocked persons.
Furthermore, engaging in certain transactions involving the persons designated today may risk the imposition of secondary sanctions on participating foreign financial institutions. OFAC can prohibit or impose strict conditions on opening or maintaining, in the United States, a correspondent account or a payable-through account of a foreign financial institution that knowingly conducts or facilitates any significant transaction on behalf of a person who is designated pursuant to the relevant authority.
The power and integrity of OFAC sanctions derive not only from OFAC’s ability to designate and add persons to the Specially Designated Nationals and Blocked Persons List (SDN List), but also from its willingness to remove persons from the SDN List consistent with the law. The ultimate goal of sanctions is not to punish, but to bring about a positive change in behavior. For information concerning the process for seeking removal from an OFAC list, including the SDN List, or to submit a request, please refer to OFAC’s guidance on Filing a Petition for Removal from an OFAC List.
Click here for more information on the persons designated today.
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