Iranian Militia Proxies are Responsible for Deaths of U.S. Personnel
WASHINGTON — Today, the U.S. Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) is taking action against individuals and companies that assist the Iranian regime in evading U.S. sanctions, smuggling weapons, and engaging in widespread corruption in Iraq. The Iranian regime relies on various Iraqi militia proxies, including U.S.-sanctioned foreign terrorist organization Kata’ib Hizballah, to penetrate Iraq’s security forces and economy.
These Iran-backed groups are not only responsible for the deaths of U.S. personnel but also conduct attacks against U.S. interests and those of our allies across the Middle East. The militias actively undermine the Iraqi economy, monopolizing resources through graft and corruption, and hinder the formation of a functioning Iraqi government that would make the region safer.
The targets today include bankers abusing the Iraqi economy to launder money for Iran and a terrorist front company that provides support and services to Iraqi militia groups. Treasury is also taking action against Iraq-based Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) assets that operate a source network that gathers information, including on U.S. forces.
“Treasury is targeting Iran-backed militia groups responsible for the deaths of U.S. personnel,” said Under Secretary of the Treasury for Terrorism and Financial Intelligence John K. Hurley. “Under Secretary Bessent’s leadership, we are working to dismantle the financial networks that enable these terrorist groups to operate. Cutting off their financial flows is essential to protecting American lives and our national security.”
Today’s action is being taken pursuant to Executive Order (E.O.) 13224, as amended, which targets terrorists and their supporters. The Department of the Treasury designated the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps-Qods Force (IRGC-QF) as a Specially Designated Global Terrorist (SDGT) pursuant to E.O. 13224 on October 25, 2007 for providing support to multiple terrorist groups. The Department of State designated the IRGC, inclusive of the IRGC-QF, as a Foreign Terrorist Organization (FTO) pursuant to the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) on April 8, 2019. Kata’ib Hizballah was designated pursuant to E.O. 13224 and as an FTO on June 24, 2009.
This action builds on OFAC’s July 3 and September 2, 2025 actions targeting individuals, entities, and vessels that have used Iraqi territory to smuggle Iranian oil fraudulently sold as Iraqi oil.
MUHANDIS GENERAL COMPANY: MASSIVE BUSINESS CONGLOMERATE SUPPORTING POPULAR MOBILIZATION FORCES AND IRAN
Kata’ib Hizballah is the most significant player in the Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF), which pushed for the creation of Muhandis General Company for Construction, Engineering, Mechanical, Agricultural, and Industrial Contracting (Muhandis General Company) to facilitate the formation of a PMF-run conglomerate. The Muhandis General Company is controlled by Popular Mobilization Commission Chief of Staff and U.S.-designated Kata’ib Hizballah leader Abd al-Aziz Malluh Mirjirash al Muhammadawi (Abu Fadak). Muhandis General Company, under the control of Kata’ib Hizballah, uses a sub-contracting method to divert funds from Iraqi government contracts. As of 2025, Muhandis General Company facilitated the award of Iraqi government contracts to companies in exchange for illicit revenue and has a contract with the Iraqi Government for undisclosed real estate projects. Baladna Agricultural Investments (Baladna) is a commercial front for Muhandis General Company. Iran continues to smuggle weapons to its militia proxy groups, and the Muhandis General Company, under its cover as an agricultural business and through connections to the IRGC-QF, played a central role in the weapons supply.
Muhandis General Company is being designated pursuant to E.O. 13224, as amended, for having materially assisted, sponsored, or provided financial, material, or technological support for, or goods or services to or in support of, Kata’ib Hizballah and the IRGC-QF; and for being owned or controlled or directed by, or having acted or purported to act for or on behalf of, directly or indirectly, Kata’ib Hizballah.
Baladna is being designated pursuant to E.O. 13224, as amended, for having materially assisted, sponsored, or provided financial, material, or technological support for, or goods or services to or in support of, Muhandis General Company.
IRGC-QF ILLICIT FINANCIAL NETWORKS IN IRAQ
Iran continually seeks to take advantage of Iraq’s economy to evade sanctions, despite progress made by many Iraqi government and financial professionals to secure and modernize their institutions. OFAC is designating three Iraqi bank executives today for abusing their positions within Iraq’s commercial banking sector to benefit the IRGC-QF, Kata’ib Hizballah, and Asa’ib Ahl al-Haq. These individuals have exploited their control over several Iraqi banks to generate revenue and launder money for terrorist groups and their Iranian backers.
Iraqi bank executive Ali Mohammed Ghulam Hussein Al Anssari (Ali Ghulam) has used his position at the top of several Iraqi commercial banks to enrich his family, the IRGC-QF, and Iranian-aligned militia groups. Ali Ghulam has given the IRGC-QF a degree of control over banks under his purview, where it has generated millions of dollars in revenue for itself and its militia proxies. Ali Ghulam has managed Kata’ib Hizballah’s finances, including investing the fortunes of Kata’ib Hizballah’s highest-ranking leaders outside of Iraq. Ali Ghulam has similarly provided financial services to Asa’ib Ahl al-Haq, including procuring U.S. dollars and laundering funds using counterfeit documents and receipts to avoid government scrutiny. Despite his illicit activities, Ali Ghulam has avoided justice in Iraq by bribing judicial authorities.
Ali Meften Khafeef Al Baidani (Ali Meften) and Aqeel Meften Khafeef Al Baidani (Aqeel Meften) are brothers who own and manage an IRGC-QF-associated Iraqi commercial bank. Ali Meften and Aqeel Meften have close relationships with senior intelligence officials of the IRGC and help generate and transfer funds for militias in Iraq that support the IRGC-QF. Ali Meften and Aqeel Meften have used their positions of ownership to support the IRGC-QF and Kata’ib Hizballah, working closely with Ali Ghulam to exploit U.S. dollar access and assisting in laundering proceeds of corruption for political parties. For decades, the Meften brothers have laundered tens of millions of dollars for Iran, and smuggled oil and drugs and abused Aqeel Meften’s position as president of Iraq’s National Olympic Committee to engage in corruption.
Ali Ghulam, Ali Meften and Aqeel Meften are being designated pursuant to E.O. 13224, as amended, for having materially assisted, sponsored, or provided financial, material, or technological support for, or goods or services to or in support of, the IRGC-QF.
IRGC INTELLIGENCE COLLECTION ON AMERICAN INTERESTS
In early 2025, Kata’ib Hizballah and IRGC officials coordinated on operations against U.S interests in Iraq. Hasan Qahtan Al-Sa’idi (Hasan) is a Baghdad-based Kata’ib Hizballah leader who operates a source network that gathers information, including on U.S. forces and presence in Iraq, on behalf of the IRGC. The network works closely with, and takes direction from, Mahmud Baghlani, a noted IRGC affiliate designated by the United States. The network also includes reported Popular Mobilization Forces members Muhammad Qahtan Al-Sa’idi (Muhammad), Hasan’s son, and Haytham Sabih Sa’id (Haytham), all of whom have gathered and shared intelligence for the purported use of the IRGC.
Hasan, Muhammad, and Haytham are being designated pursuant to E.O. 13224, as amended, for having materially assisted, sponsored, or provided financial, material, or technological support for, or goods or services to or in support of, the IRGC.
SANCTIONS IMPLICATIONS
As a result of today’s action, all property and interests in property of the designated or blocked persons described above that are in the United States or in the possession or control of U.S. persons are blocked and must be reported to OFAC. In addition, any entities that are owned, directly or indirectly, individually or in the aggregate, 50 percent or more by one or more blocked persons are also blocked. Unless authorized by a general or specific license issued by OFAC, or exempt, OFAC’s regulations generally prohibit all transactions by U.S. persons or within (or transiting) the United States that involve any property or interests in property of blocked persons.
Violations of U.S. sanctions may result in the imposition of civil or criminal penalties on U.S. and foreign persons. OFAC may impose civil penalties for sanctions violations on a strict liability basis. OFAC’s Economic Sanctions Enforcement Guidelines provide more information regarding OFAC’s enforcement of U.S. economic sanctions. In addition, financial institutions and other persons may risk exposure to sanctions for engaging in certain transactions or activities involving designated or otherwise blocked persons. The prohibitions include the making of any contribution or provision of funds, goods, or services by, to, or for the benefit of any designated or blocked person, or the receipt of any contribution or provision of funds, goods, or services from any such person.
Furthermore, engaging in certain transactions involving the persons designated today may risk the imposition of secondary sanctions on participating foreign financial institutions. OFAC can prohibit or impose strict conditions on opening or maintaining, in the United States, a correspondent account or a payable-through account of a foreign financial institution that knowingly conducts or facilitates any significant transaction on behalf of a person who is designated pursuant to the relevant authority.
The power and integrity of OFAC sanctions derive not only from OFAC’s ability to designate and add persons to the Specially Designated Nationals and Blocked Persons List (SDN List), but also from its willingness to remove persons from the SDN List consistent with the law. The ultimate goal of sanctions is not to punish, but to bring about a positive change in behavior. For information concerning the process for seeking removal from an OFAC list, including the SDN List, or to submit a request, please refer to OFAC’s guidance on Filing a Petition for Removal from an OFAC List.
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