WASHINGTON — Today, the U.S. Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) is targeting 32 individuals and entities based in Iran, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), Türkiye, China, Hong Kong, India, Germany, and Ukraine that operate multiple procurement networks supporting Iran’s ballistic missile and unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) production.
“Across the globe, Iran exploits financial systems to launder funds, procure components for its nuclear and conventional weapons programs, and support its terrorist proxies,” said Under Secretary of the Treasury for Terrorism and Financial Intelligence John K. Hurley. “At the direction of President Trump, we are putting maximum pressure on Iran to end its nuclear threat. The United States also expects the international community to fully implement UN snapback sanctions on Iran to cut off its access to the global financial system.”
These networks pose a threat to U.S. and allied personnel in the Middle East and to commercial shipping in the Red Sea. As Iran seeks to reconstitute its proliferation-sensitive capabilities destroyed during following the 12‑Day War, OFAC is acting to disrupt the procurement of key components, such as missile propellant precursors, and to prevent those assisting Iran from accessing the U.S. financial system. This action represents Treasury’s second round of nonproliferation sanctions in support of the September 27, 2025, reimposition of United Nations sanctions on Iran, which occurred as a direct result of Iran’s continued non‑compliance with its international commitments.
Today’s action is being taken in furtherance of National Security Presidential Memorandum 2, which directs the U.S. government to curtail Iran’s ballistic missile program, counter Iran’s development of other asymmetric and conventional weapons capabilities, deny Iran a nuclear weapon, and deny the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) access to assets and resources that sustain their destabilizing activities.
OFAC is taking this action pursuant to Executive Order (E.O.) 13382, which targets weapons of mass destruction (WMD) proliferators and their supporters; and E.O. 13224, as amended, which targets terrorist groups, their supporters, and those who aid acts of terrorism. In October 2007, the U.S. Department of State designated the IRGC and Iran’s Ministry of Defense and Armed Forces Logistics (MODAFL) pursuant to E.O. 13382, and the U.S. Department of the Treasury designated Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps-Qods Force (IRGC-QF) pursuant to E.O. 13224.
IRAN’S MISSILE PROPELLANT INGREDIENT PROCUREMENT
Today, OFAC is sanctioning a multinational procurement network centered around a three‑person venture known as the “MVM partnership.” Since 2023, the partnership and its network have coordinated the procurement of ballistic missile propellant ingredients––including sodium chlorate, sodium perchlorate, and sebacic acid––from China on behalf of Parchin Chemical Industries (PCI), an element of Iran’s Defense Industries Organization (DIO) that is responsible for the import and export of chemical goods. OFAC designated PCI pursuant to E.O. 13382 in July 2008, and the Department of State designated DIO pursuant to E.O. 13382 in March 2007. Both DIO and PCI are also subject to an asset freeze pursuant to UN Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1737 and UNSCR 1747, respectively.
Sodium chlorate is used to produce sodium perchlorate, which is used to manufacture the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR)-controlled chemical ammonium perchlorate. Ammonium perchlorate is used in solid propellant rocket motors, which are commonly used for ballistic missiles. Sebacic acid is used to produce resins—which are materials sought by Iran for its ballistic missile program—and plasticizers, certain types of which are propellant additives and agents controlled by the MTCR.
Figure 1: Production of missile propellant ingredients
Through its network, the MVM partnership has procured and transported hundreds of metric tons of missile propellant ingredients from China since its establishment in 2023. UAE-based Marco Klinge (Klinge) and Iran- and Türkiye-based Majid Dolatkhah (Dolatkhah) have coordinated and facilitated the procurement of materials including sodium chlorate, sodium perchlorate, and sebacic acid for PCI. Klinge, who has been responsible for the partnership’s procurement from India and China, has liaised between the partnership and suppliers including OFAC-designated China Chlorate Tech Co Limited (CCT). Dolatkhah, who has been responsible for the partnership’s procurement from Türkiye, has served as a liaison between PCI and Klinge. Iran- and Türkiye-based Vahid Qayumi (Qayumi) has been responsible for the partnership’s chemical business inside Iran and has served as a liaison between PCI and the other MVM partners. OFAC designated CCT pursuant to E.O. 13382 on April 29, 2025.
Klinge, Dolatkhah, and Qayumi are being designated pursuant to E.O. 13382 for having provided, or attempted to provide, financial, material, technological or other support for, or goods or services in support of, PCI.
Klinge is the point of contact for UAE-based company MVM Amici Trading LLC (MVM Amici) and has arranged MVM Amici’s procurement of China-origin sodium chlorate for use in Iran. Klinge also serves as the director of India-based Farmlane Private Limited (Farmlane) and as the chief executive officer of Germany-based EVA Handelsgesellschaft UG (EVA).
MVM Amici, Farmlane, and EVA are being designated pursuant to E.O. 13382 for being owned or controlled by, or acting or purporting to act for or on behalf of, directly or indirectly, Klinge.
Qayumi serves as the chairman of the board of Iran-based Zagros Shimi Fars Manufacturing Industries Company (Zagros Shimi Fars) and Furqan Novin Pars Manufacturing and Commercial Industries (Furqan Novin Pars). UAE-based Vahid Ghayoumy Goods Wholesalers LLC (VGGW) has shipped sebacic acid from China to Zagros Shimi Fars in Iran.
Zagros Shimi Fars and Furqan Novin Pars are being designated pursuant to E.O. 13382 for being owned or controlled by, or acting or purporting to act for or on behalf of, directly or indirectly, Qayumi. VGGW is being designated pursuant to E.O. 13382 for having provided, or attempted to provide, financial, material, technological or other support for, or goods or services in support of, Zagros Shimi Fars.
Figure 2: Supply routes of missile propellant ingredients
procurement of crucial UAV equipment for the irgc-QF
OFAC is also targeting several persons in connection with Iran-based Kimia Part Sivan Company (KIPAS), which has worked with the IRGC-QF to improve its UAV program. OFAC designated KIPAS pursuant to E.O. 13224, as amended, in October 2021 for having materially assisted the IRGC-QF. The Department of State designated the IRGC in its entirety, including the IRGC-QF, as a Foreign Terrorist Organization in April 2019.
As recently as early 2025, Iran-based KIPAS subsidiary Iranian Baspar Puya Company (PARPO) has produced and repaired components for KIPAS-manufactured UAVs and provided manufacturing services in support of KIPAS’s UAV assembly line. PARPO has produced hundreds of components, very likely for UAVs, and has had frequent contact with employees associated with KIPAS and IRGC-QF. Iran-based KIPAS front company Pars Navandishan Artificial Intelligence Projects Company (ARIAPA) has provided KIPAS with technical support for manufacturing UAVs, including a project for developing UAV electronics, and assisted KIPAS employees between mid-2024 and early 2025.
PARPO and ARIAPA are being designated pursuant to E.O. 13224, as amended, for having materially assisted, sponsored, or provided financial, material, or technological support for, or goods or services to or in support of, KIPAS.
Seyyed Ali Abtahi (Abtahi) is a KIPAS and PARPO employee who manages the facility that produced and repaired UAV components. Between mid-2024 and early 2025, Abtahi oversaw the production of UAV components. In the spring of 2025, Iran-based IRGC-QF-associated KIPAS affiliate Seyyed Mohammad Ruhani (Ruhani) worked with Iran-based, IRGC‑QF‑associated KIPAS affiliate Hosein Sayyadi Turanlu (Turanlu) on the ARIAPA project pertaining to manufacturing UAV electronics. Additionally, in late 2024, Ruhani oversaw KIPAS efforts to purchase a UAV engine and other equipment, and Turanlu supervised ARIAPA personnel and oversaw a project requiring electronics. Between late 2024 and early 2025, KIPAS Logistics Manager Ehsan Mohaghegh Dolatabadi (Dolatabadi) oversaw the acquisition of components required to produce UAVs and shipments of UAV engines to Iran.
Abtahi, Ruhani, Turanlu, and Dolatabadi are being designated pursuant to E.O. 13224, as amended, for being owned, controlled, or directed by, or having acted or purported to act for or on behalf of, directly or indirectly, KIPAS.
Iran-based MADO Proliferation Finance network
OFAC is designating one individual and 11 entities involved in a procurement network supporting Iran-based Oje Parvas Mado Nafar Company (Mado). Mado produces UAV engines used in Iran’s Shahed-131 and Shahed-136 UAVs. OFAC designated Mado pursuant to E.O. 13382 in October 2021 for having provided support to the IRGC.
China-based national Ma Jie (Ma) supports Mado’s affairs in China, including making travel arrangements for visiting Mado employees and coordinating meetings between Iranian defense officials and their China-based suppliers. Ma holds leadership roles in multiple companies based in China and Hong Kong. Ma is the manager, executive director, and majority owner of China‑based Yiwu City Xianma Import and Export Co Ltd (Yiwu City Xianma), as well as the director and l00 percent owner of Hong Kong-based companies Qian Xi Long Trading Co Limited (Qian Xi Long) and Hin Yun Trading Company Limited (Hin Yun).
Ma is being designated pursuant to E.O. 13382 for having provided, or attempted to provide, financial, material, technological or other support for, or goods or services in support of, Mado. Yiwu City Xianma, Qian Xi Long and Hin Yun are being designated pursuant to E.O. 13382 for being owned or controlled by, or acting or purporting to act for or on behalf of, directly or indirectly, Ma.
Ma’s Hong Kong-based companies Qian Xi Long and Hin Yun have been involved in facilitating millions of dollars in transactions. Qian Xi Long received hundreds of thousands of dollars of payments from Türkiye-based companies Arkedya Gida Tekstil Dis Ticaret Sanayi Limited Sirketi (Arkedya), Intro Oto Yedek Parca Ithalat Ihracat Ticaret ve Sanayi Limited Sirketi (Intro Oto), Own Ucar Gida Insaat Sanayi ve Ticaret Limited Sirketi (Own Ucar), and Royal Yapi lnsaat Emlak Gida ve Tekstil Urunleri Turizm Sanayi Dis Ticaret Limited Sirketi (Royal Yapi). In addition, Qian Xi Long sent Hong Kong-based Yiren Zhuang Trading Co Limited (Yiren) over $450,000 in exchange for aluminum alloy castings and spark plug caps.
Hin Yun received hundreds of thousands of dollars of payments from Türkiye-based companies Loris Turizm Organizasyon Ithalat ve Ihracat Limited Sirketi (Loris), Ozkam Nakliyat Petrol Ithalat lhracat Sanayi Ticaret Limited Sirketi (Ozkam), and Artas Gumrukleme Ithalat lhracat Sinir Ticareti Tekstil Gida ve Sanayi Ticaret Limited Sirketi (Artas).
Arkedya, Intro Oto, Own Ucar, Royal Yapi, and Yiren are being designated pursuant to E.O. 13382 for having provided, or attempted to provide, financial, material, technological or other support for, or goods or services in support of, Qian Xi Long. Loris, Ozkam, and Artas are being designated pursuant to E.O. 13382 for having provided, or attempted to provide, financial, material, technological or other support for, or goods and services in support of, Hin Yun.
Iran Aircraft Manufacturing Industrial Company UAV procurement
OFAC is also targeting a procurement network supporting Iran Aircraft Manufacturing Industrial Company (HESA), a state-owned subsidiary of MODAFL that produces Iran’s military aircraft and Ababil-series UAVs. OFAC is concurrently updating HESA’s Specially Designated Nationals and Blocked Persons List (SDN List) entry to include its new alias, FTP Co.
Iran-based procurement agent Bahram Tabibi (Tabibi) has utilized his Ukraine-based front companies GK Imperativ Ukraina LLC (GK Imperativ) and Ekofera LLC (Ekofera) to procure and supply aerospace materials, including attitude indicators and magnetometers, for HESA. Iran-based Batoul Shafiei (Shafiei) actively participated in the scheme to supply parts to HESA, having facilitated GK Imperativ and Ekofera’s receipt of payments from HESA, as well as Ekofera’s shipments destined for HESA in Iran. Iran-based Saeed Pahlavani Nejad (Nejad) served as an intermediary between the Ukraine-based front companies and HESA, and facilitated sales of alternator components, engines, attitude indicators, sensors, and other equipment to HESA.
Tabibi, GK Imperativ, Ekofera, Shafiei, and Nejad are being designated pursuant to E.O. 13382 for having provided, or attempted to provide, financial, material, technological or other support for, or goods and services in support of, HESA.
SDN LIST ENTRY FOR SHUN KAI XING
OFAC is also updating the SDN List entry for the bulk carrier vessel previously known as SHUN KAI XING to reflect its new name, HONESTAR. The then-SHUN KAI XING was identified by OFAC on June 20, 2025 as property in which Unico Shipping Co Ltd, a person whose property and interests in property are blocked pursuant to E.O. 13382, has an interest. At the time of its identification, the then-SHUN KAI XING was attempting to transport sensitive machinery for Iran’s defense industry. The HONESTAR is currently stateless and attempting to carry false flags.
The HONESTAR’s recent updates were likely orchestrated in an attempt to obfuscate their delivery of sensitive machinery to Iran—specifically, a computer numerical control (commonly referred to as CNC) machine used to produce fiber optic gyroscopes, guidance and control systems for weapons systems including ballistic missiles and UAVs.
SANCTIONS IMPLICATIONS
As a result of today’s action, all property and interests in property of the designated or blocked persons described above that are in the United States or in the possession or control of U.S. persons are blocked and must be reported to OFAC. In addition, any entities that are owned, directly or indirectly, individually or in the aggregate, 50 percent or more by one or more blocked persons are also blocked. Unless authorized by a general or specific license issued by OFAC, or exempt, OFAC’s regulations generally prohibit all transactions by U.S. persons or within (or transiting) the United States that involve any property or interests in property of blocked persons.
Violations of U.S. sanctions may result in the imposition of civil or criminal penalties on U.S. and foreign persons. OFAC may impose civil penalties for sanctions violations on a strict liability basis. OFAC’s Economic Sanctions Enforcement Guidelines provide more information regarding OFAC’s enforcement of U.S. economic sanctions. In addition, financial institutions and other persons may risk exposure to sanctions for engaging in certain transactions or activities with designated or otherwise blocked persons.
Furthermore, engaging in certain transactions involving the persons designated today may risk the imposition of secondary sanctions on participating foreign financial institutions. OFAC can prohibit or impose strict conditions on opening or maintaining, in the United States, a correspondent account or a payable-through account of a foreign financial institution that knowingly conducts or facilitates any significant transaction on behalf of a person who is designated pursuant to the relevant authority.
The power and integrity of OFAC sanctions derive not only from OFAC’s ability to designate and add persons to the SDN List, but also from its willingness to remove persons from the SDN List consistent with the law. The ultimate goal of sanctions is not to punish, but to bring about a positive change in behavior. For information concerning the process for seeking removal from an OFAC list, including the SDN List, or to submit a request, please refer to OFAC’s guidance on Filing a Petition for Removal from an OFAC List.
Click here for more information on the persons designated today.
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