WASHINGTON — Today, the Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) is sanctioning an international network for facilitating the shipment of millions of barrels of Iranian crude oil worth hundreds of millions of dollars to the People’s Republic of China (PRC). The oil was shipped on behalf of Iran’s Armed Forces General Staff (AFGS) and its sanctioned front company, Sepehr Energy Jahan Nama Pars (Sepehr Energy). This action includes entities and individuals in multiple jurisdictions, including the PRC, India, and the United Arab Emirates (UAE), as well as several vessels.
Iran generates the equivalent of billions of dollars each year via oil sales to fund its destabilizing regional activities and support of multiple regional terrorist groups, including Hamas, the Houthis, and Hizballah. The AFGS utilizes networks of foreign-based front companies and brokers to enable these oil sales and shipments.
“The Iranian regime remains focused on leveraging its oil revenues to fund the development of its nuclear program, to produce its deadly ballistic missiles and unmanned aerial vehicles, and to support its regional terrorist proxy groups,” said Secretary of the Treasury Scott Bessent. “The United States is committed to aggressively targeting any attempt by Iran to secure funding for these malign activities.”
Today’s action is being taken pursuant to the counterterrorism authority Executive Order (E.O.) 13224, as amended by E.O. 13886 (“E.O. 13224, as amended”), and E.O. 13902, which provides authority to the Secretary of the Treasury, in consultation with the Secretary of State, to identify and impose sanctions on key sectors of Iran’s economy. This action is consistent with the President’s February 4 National Security Presidential Memorandum directing the Treasury Department and other U.S. government agencies to enact maximum economic pressure on Iran in order to deny all paths to a nuclear weapon and counter Iran’s malign influence.
OFAC designated Sepehr Energy pursuant to E.O. 13224, as amended, on November 29, 2023, for having materially assisted, sponsored, or provided financial, material, or technological support for, or goods or services to or in support of, Iran’s Ministry of Defense and Armed Forces Logistics (MODAFL). OFAC designated MODAFL pursuant to E.O. 13224 on March 26, 2019 for providing material support to Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps-Qods Force. On October 11, 2024, the Secretary of the Treasury identified the petroleum and petrochemical sectors of the Iranian economy as subject to sanctions pursuant to section 1(a)(i) of E.O. 13902.
THE SIRI
Sepehr Energy and its affiliate companies, which operate under the umbrella of the AFGS, use deceitful evasion methods such as falsification of maritime documents to obfuscate the Iranian origin of the oil that it trades and transports to overseas buyers, including the PRC. This revenue stream generates billions of dollars for the AFGS each year, which is used to fund Iran’s military and proxies and their destabilizing activities around the world.
The Comoros-flagged and sanctioned oil tanker ANTHEA (IMO: 9281683), currently known as the SIRI, is operating off the coast of Singapore laden with millions of barrels of Iranian crude oil in the interest of Sepehr Energy and the AFGS. The SIRI is obfuscating its identity by operating as the NEW PRIME. Iranian national Arash Lavian (Lavian) serves as the SIRI’s master and has taken steps to falsify shipping documents and physically hide the true name of the SIRI to conceal that the vessel is sanctioned.
Arash Lavian is being designated pursuant to E.O. 13224, as amended, for having materially assisted, sponsored, or provided financial, material, or technological support for, or goods or services to or in support of, Sepehr Energy. OFAC is also updating the Specially Designated Nationals and Blocked Persons List (SDN List) to reflect that the ANTHEA now operates as the SIRI.
India-based crew management company Marshal Ship Management Private Limited, which maintains additional offices in the Philippines and the UAE, provided crew members for the SIRI, as well as multiple other Sepehr Energy-linked ships, including the sanctioned vessels ELSA (IMO: 9256468), HEBE (IMO: 9259185), and BOREAS (IMO: 9248497). Crew members provided by Marshal Ship Management Private Limited have aided Sepehr Energy in falsifying shipping documents and presenting those documents to port authorities.
Indian national Ryan Xavier Aranha acts as a director for Marshal Ship Management Private Limited.
Marshal Ship Management Private Limited is being designated pursuant to E.O. 13224, as amended, for having materially assisted, sponsored, or provided financial, material, or technological support for, or goods or services to or in support of, Sepehr Energy. Ryan Xavier Aranha is being designated for having acted or purported to act for or on behalf of, directly or indirectly, Marshal Ship Management Private Limited.
OTHER AFGS COMMERCIAL ACTIVITY
Sanctioned Sepehr Energy official Elyas Niroomand Toomaj (Toomaj) continues to orchestrate illicit Iranian oil shipments on behalf of Sepehr Energy and the AFGS. In December 2024, Sepehr Energy and Toomaj shipped nearly two million barrels of Iranian heavy crude oil, worth over $100 million, aboard the Cameroon-flagged OXIS (IMO: 9224805), owned by Seychelles-based Miletus Line Ltd, for delivery to the PRC. Similarly, Sepehr Energy used the Panama-flagged GIOIOSA (IMO: 9198082), owned by Hong Kong-based Gozoso Group Ltd, to transport over 700,000 barrels of Iranian oil, worth tens of millions of dollars, for delivery to the PRC. Hong Kong-based Ocean Dolphin Ship Management Ltd acted as the manager and operator of the GIOIOSA and Kazakhstan-based and Seychelles-registered Umbra Navi Ship Management Corp (Umbra Navi) acted as the technical manager of the OXIS during these shipments.
The OXIS and Umbra Navi were previously sanctioned by the Department of State pursuant to E.O. 14024 on January 10, 2025 for their role in a ship-to-ship transfer of Russian-origin crude oil benefitting U.S.-designated Joint Stock Company SOVCOMFLOT. Toomaj was designated alongside Sepehr Energy pursuant to E.O. 13224, as amended, for having acted or purported to act for or on behalf of, directly or indirectly, Sepehr Energy.
Miletus Line Ltd, Gozoso Group Ltd, Ocean Dolphin Ship Management Ltd, and Umbra Navi are being designated pursuant to E.O. 13224, as amended, for having materially assisted, sponsored, or provided financial, material, or technological support for, or goods or services to or in support of, Sepehr Energy. The OXIS and GIOIOSA are being identified pursuant to E.O. 13224, as amended, as blocked property in the interest of Miletus Line Ltd and Gozoso Group Ltd, respectively.
AFGS OVERSIGHT OF SEPEHR ENERGY AND ITS AFFILIATES
The AFGS continues to directly oversee the operations of Sepehr Energy. AFGS Brigadier General Jamshid Eshaghi (Eshaghi) serves as the AFGS Office of Budget and Financial Affairs Chief and previously served as an official of Sepehr Energy. Eshaghi previously coordinated with the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) on the sale of Iranian crude oil to the PRC.
Sepehr Energy is the parent company of several Iran-based companies operating in the Iranian oil sector: Sepehr Energy Hamta Pars, Sepehr Energy Jahan Nama Taban, and Sepehr Energy Paya Gostar Jahan, which share many of the same company officials. Like Sepehr Energy, these companies facilitate Iranian oil shipments on behalf of the AFGS. For example, in January 2025, Sepehr Energy Jahan Nama Taban arranged the shipment of nearly two million barrels of oil to the PRC via the OXIS.
Farshad Ghazi serves as the managing director of Sepehr Energy Hamta Pars. Farbod Mohseni Ahari serves as the chairman of Sepehr Energy Paya Gostar Jahan. Mohammad Ali Riazi Kolahdozmahaleh has served as the chairman of the board of directors for multiple Sepehr Energy companies.
Sepehr Energy Hamta Pars, Sepehr Energy Jahan Nama Taban, and Sepehr Energy Paya Gostar Jahan are being designated pursuant to E.O. 13224, as amended, for being owned, controlled, or directed by, directly or indirectly, Sepehr Energy. Farshad Ghazi, Farbod Mohseni Ahari, Jamshid Eshaghi, and Mohammad Ali Riazi Kolahdozmahaleh are being designated pursuant to E.O. 13224, as amended, for having acted or purported to act for or on behalf of, directly or indirectly, Sepehr Energy.
ADDITIONAL SHADOW FLEET DESIGNATIONS
The Panama-flagged CH BILLION (IMO: 9276585) and the Hong Kong-flagged STAR FOREST (IMO: 9237632) are being identified as blocked property for their role in transporting Iranian oil to the PRC. As recently as January 2025, these vessels onboarded Iranian crude oil from storage in the PRC, part of a scheme involving Iran’s military, which stands to profit from the sale of the oil on these vessels.
CH BILLION and STAR FOREST have a history of transporting Iranian oil. In August 2024, the CH BILLION conducted a ship-to-ship transfer with the National Iranian tanker Company (NITC) tanker HEDY (IMO: 9212888) and received more than 600,000 barrels of Iranian crude oil. Over the past few years, the STAR FOREST has shipped over 100 million dollars’ worth of oil on behalf of the IRGC to the PRC.
Hong Kong-based Young Folks International Trading Co., Limited is the registered owner, ship manager, and operator of the CH BILLION. PRC-based Lucky Ocean Shipping Limited is the operator and manager of the STAR FOREST.
Young Folks International Trading Co., Limited and Lucky Ocean Shipping Limited are being designated pursuant to E.O. 13902 for operating in Iran’s petroleum sector.
The CH BILLION is being identified as property in which Young Folks International Trading Co., Limited has an interest. STAR FOREST is being identified as property in which Lucky Ocean Shipping Limited has an interest.
SANCTIONS IMPLICATIONS
As a result of today’s action, all property and interests in property of the designated persons described above that are in the United States or in the possession or control of U.S. persons is blocked and must be reported to OFAC. In addition, any entities that are owned, directly or indirectly, individually or in the aggregate, 50 percent or more by one or more blocked persons are also blocked. Unless authorized by a general or specific license issued by OFAC or exempt, U.S. sanctions generally prohibit all transactions by U.S. persons or within (or transiting) the United States that involve any property or interests in property of designated or otherwise blocked persons.
Violations of U.S. sanctions may result in the imposition of civil or criminal penalties on U.S. and foreign persons. OFAC may impose civil penalties for sanctions violations on a strict liability basis. OFAC’s Economic Sanctions Enforcement Guidelines provide more information regarding OFAC’s enforcement of U.S. economic sanctions. In addition, financial institutions and other persons may risk exposure to sanctions for engaging in certain transactions or activities with designated or otherwise blocked persons.
Furthermore, engaging in certain transactions with the individuals designated today entails risk of secondary sanctions pursuant to E.O. 13224, as amended. Pursuant to this authority, OFAC can prohibit or impose strict conditions on the opening or maintaining in the United States of a correspondent account or a payable-through account of any foreign financial institution that knowingly conducted or facilitated any significant transaction on behalf of a Specially Designated Global Terrorist.
The power and integrity of OFAC sanctions derive not only from OFAC’s ability to designate and add persons to the SDN List, but also from its willingness to remove persons from the SDN List consistent with the law. The ultimate goal of sanctions is not to punish, but to bring about a positive change in behavior. For information concerning the process for seeking removal from an OFAC list, including the SDN List, please refer to OFAC’s Frequently Asked Question 897 here and to submit a request for removal, click here.
Click here for more information on the individuals and entities designated today.
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