WASHINGTON — Today, the U.S. Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) is taking action against seven high-ranking members of Ansarallah, commonly known as the Houthis. These individuals have smuggled military-grade items and weapon systems into Houthi-controlled areas of Yemen and also negotiated Houthi weapons procurements from Russia. OFAC is also designating one Houthi-affiliated operative and his company that have recruited Yemeni civilians to fight on behalf of Russia in Ukraine and generated revenue to support the Houthis’ militant operations.
“By seeking weapons from a growing array of international suppliers, Houthi leaders have shown their intent to continue their reckless and destabilizing actions in the Red Sea region,” said Secretary of the Treasury Scott Bessent. “The United States will use all available tools to disrupt the Houthis’ terrorist activities and degrade their ability to threaten U.S. personnel, our regional partners, and global maritime trade.”
Today’s action is being taken pursuant to the counterterrorism authority Executive Order (E.O.) 13224, as amended, and builds on OFAC’s June 17, 2024, July 31, 2024, October 2, 2024, and December 19, 2024 actions targeting Houthi weapons procurement operatives and suppliers. The U.S. Department of State designated Ansarallah as a Specially Designated Global Terrorist (SDGT) pursuant to E.O. 13224, as amended, effective February 16, 2024, for having committed or attempted to commit, posing a significant risk of committing, or having participated in training to commit acts of terrorism. Yesterday, the Department of State announced the re-designation of Ansarallah as a Foreign Terrorist Organization pursuant to section 219 of the Immigration and Nationality Act, as amended.
HOUTHI POLITICAL AND MILITANT FIGURES
Houthi political operatives, including some of the group’s most prominent members, have sought new sources of advanced weapons, military grade materiel, and foreign support to drive attacks. Mohammad Abdulsalam (Abdulsalam) is the Houthis’ Oman-based spokesman and has played a key role in managing the Houthis’ internal and external financing network. Abdulsalam has also facilitated the Houthis’ efforts to secure weapons and other support from Russia. As part of this effort, Abdulsalam has traveled to Moscow to meet with Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs personnel and has coordinated with Russian military personnel to arrange for additional Houthi delegations to visit Russia.
Eshaq Abdulmalek Abdullah Almarwani (Almarwani) is a high-ranking Houthi operative and aide to Abdulsalam. Almarwani has participated in high-level Houthi delegations to Russia for discussions at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Moscow and has coordinated with other high-ranking Houthi operatives to advance Houthi interests internationally.
Mahdi Mohammed Hussein Al-Mashat (Al-Mashat) is the Chairman of the Houthi-aligned Supreme Political Council (SPC). As SPC Chairman, Al-Mashat has worked to increase cooperation between the Houthis and the Government of Russia, including with Russian President Vladimir Putin. Also, Al-Mashat issues official statements on behalf of the Houthis outlining the group’s militant and diplomatic positions.
Mohamed Ali Al-Houthi (Mohamed Ali) is an important operative within the Houthi group, serving as a member of the SPC and former chairman of the SPC’s predecessor, the Supreme Revolutionary Committee. Amid the Houthis’ ongoing maritime attack campaign, Mohamed Ali has communicated with officials from Russia and the People’s Republic of China (PRC) to ensure that Houthi militants do not strike Russian or PRC vessels transiting the Red Sea. Speaking on behalf of the Houthis, Mohamed Ali has outlined the Houthis’ commitment to guarantee safe passage for Russian vessels. Mohamed Ali has also planned travel to Russia with other Houthi militant and intelligence operatives to discuss Russian aid to the Houthis.
Ali Muhammad Muhsin Salih Al-Hadi (Al-Hadi) is the head of the Houthi-aligned Sanaa Chamber of Commerce (SCC), having served in this role since the Houthis raided and took control of the SCC in May 2023. Following his appointment to the SCC, Al-Hadi became a key financier of Houthi weapons procurement, using his position on the SCC and shell company to fund and obfuscate purchases of military-grade equipment on behalf of the Houthis. As part of this effort, he has traveled to Russia to secure defense equipment for Houthi militants and investment in Houthi-controlled industries.
Abdulmalek Abdullah Mohammed E Alagri (Alagri) is a senior Houthi operative. Alagri has traveled as a member of prominent Houthi political and military delegations to Moscow, where he has represented Houthi interests in meetings with high-ranking Russian officials, as well as to the PRC. Alagri has also issued official statements on behalf of the Houthis describing the group’s efforts to counter international economic pressure against Houthi-aligned banking institutions in Yemen.
Khaled Hussein Saleh Gaber (Gaber) is a Houthi operative who has traveled on Houthi delegations to Russia, where he has participated in meetings with Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs officials. Gaber also maintains a close relationship with Houthi financial official Said Al-Jamal and coordinates illicit procurement and finance activities with Al-Jamal’s network.
Abdulsalam, Almarwani, Al-Mashat, Mohamed Ali, Al-Hadi, Alagri, and Gaber are being designated pursuant to E.O. 13224, as amended, for having acted or purported to act for or on behalf of, directly or indirectly, Ansarallah.
RECRUITMENT OF YEMENIS TO FIGHT FOR RUSSIA
Houthi leaders have devised numerous revenue-generating schemes to enable their attack campaign, often at the expense of Yemen’s most vulnerable populations. In one such effort, individuals acting on behalf of the Houthis operated a lucrative human smuggling operation, recruiting Yemeni civilians to fight for Russia in Ukraine, often under false and misleading pretenses.
Abdulwali Abdoh Hasan Al-Jabri (Al-Jabri), a Houthi militant operative who served as a so-called major general in the Houthi militia, facilitated a key part of this effort using his company, Al-Jabri General Trading and Investment Co (Al-Jabri Co). Through Al-Jabri Co, Al-Jabri facilitated the transfer of Yemeni civilians to Russian military units fighting in Ukraine in exchange for cash, generating a new source of revenue on behalf of Houthi leaders.
Al-Jabri is being designated pursuant to E.O. 13224, as amended, for having acted or purported to act for or on behalf of, directly or indirectly, Ansarallah. Al-Jabri Co is being designated pursuant to E.O. 13224, as amended, for being owned, controlled, or directed by, or having acted or purported to act for or on behalf of, directly or indirectly, Al-Jabri.
SANCTIONS IMPLICATIONS
As a result of today’s action, all property and interests in property of the designated persons described above that are in the United States or in the possession or control of U.S. persons is/are blocked and must be reported to OFAC. In addition, any entities that are owned, directly or indirectly, individually or in the aggregate, 50 percent or more by one or more blocked persons are also blocked. Unless authorized by a general or specific license issued by OFAC or exempt, U.S. sanctions generally prohibit all transactions by U.S. persons or within (or transiting) the United States that involve any property or interests in property of designated or otherwise blocked persons.
Violations of U.S. sanctions may result in the imposition of civil or criminal penalties on U.S. and foreign persons. OFAC may impose civil penalties for sanctions violations on a strict liability basis. OFAC’s Economic Sanctions Enforcement Guidelines provide more information regarding OFAC’s enforcement of U.S. economic sanctions. In addition, financial institutions and other persons may risk exposure to sanctions for engaging in certain transactions or activities with designated or otherwise blocked persons.
Furthermore, engaging in certain transactions with the individuals and entities designated today entails risk of secondary sanctions pursuant to E.O. 13224, as amended. Pursuant to this authority, OFAC can prohibit or impose strict conditions on the opening or maintaining in the United States of a correspondent account or a payable-through account of a foreign financial institution that knowingly conducted or facilitated any significant transaction on behalf of a Specially Designated Global Terrorist.
Exports, reexports, or transfers of items subject to U.S. export controls involving persons included on the SDN List pursuant to E.O. 13224, as amended, may be subject to additional restrictions administered by the Department of Commerce, Bureau of Industry and Security. See 15 C.F.R. section 744.8 for additional information.
The power and integrity of OFAC sanctions derive not only from OFAC’s ability to designate and add persons to the SDN List, but also from its willingness to remove persons from the SDN List consistent with the law. The ultimate goal of sanctions is not to punish, but to bring about a positive change in behavior. For information concerning the process for seeking removal from an OFAC list, including the SDN List, please refer to OFAC’s Frequently Asked Question 897 here and to submit a request for removal, click here.
Click here for more information on the individuals and entity identified today.
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