WASHINGTON—Today, the U.S. Department of the Treasury’s Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN) issued a Financial Trend Analysis focused on patterns and trends identified in Bank Secrecy Act (BSA) data linked to fentanyl-related illicit finance. Between January and December 2024, financial institutions filed 1,246 BSA reports that identified suspected fentanyl-related activity amounting to approximately $1.4 billion in suspicious transactions. The reported financial activity highlighted various aspects of the illicit fentanyl supply chain—including precursor chemical procurement, fentanyl trafficking, and fentanyl-linked money laundering—that have touchpoints across the U.S. financial sector.
“As Treasury continues to prioritize combating the illegal production and trafficking of fentanyl, our public-private partnerships are vital,” said Secretary of the Treasury, Scott Bessent. “As today’s analysis shows, the information we receive from financial institutions is a critical element in our ability to more effectively investigate and disrupt the malicious actors that profit off this unprecedented epidemic, and ultimately aids in the effort to save American lives.”
Illicit fentanyl is primarily synthesized, trafficked, and smuggled into the United States by Mexican cartels. The Sinaloa Cartel and the Cartel Jalisco Nueva Generacion—which are Foreign Terrorist Organizations, Specially Designated Global Terrorists, and Drug Trafficking Organizations—largely control the fentanyl supply chain from Mexico and use precursor chemicals and manufacturing equipment primarily sourced from the People’s Republic of China (PRC) to synthesize illicit fentanyl in clandestine laboratories. FinCEN analysis identified Mexico and the PRC as the top two foreign countries listed in subject address fields of fentanyl-related BSA reports filed in 2024.
Additional findings of FinCEN’s analysis include:
The cartels and associated chemical brokers use front companies, money mules, and U.S.-based intermediaries to procure fentanyl precursor chemicals from PRC-based suppliers.
PRC-based chemical suppliers accept a wide range of payment methods and often leverage public advertisements, including e-commerce platforms, to market fentanyl precursor chemicals.
Fentanyl-related financial activity in the United States primarily involved subjects in populous states with large urban areas that have established drug distribution networks and serve as collection points for illicit proceeds, including a substantial number of subjects in southwest border counties in California and Arizona.
Domestic sales of fentanyl appeared to be conducted primarily in cash and peer-to-peer transfers, which were referenced in 54 and 51 percent of BSA reports, respectively.
Methods to launder suspected fentanyl proceeds varied in sophistication. BSA filers identified complex schemes, including the use of suspected Chinese money laundering organizations potentially facilitating the movement of illicit fentanyl proceeds on behalf of the cartels.
Combating drug cartels and stopping the flow of deadly drugs into the United States is one of the Administration’s highest priorities. As such, FinCEN continues to encourage financial institutions to carefully review its August 2019 and June 2024 advisories on the trafficking of fentanyl, fentanyl analogues, and other synthetic opioids and the precursor chemicals and associated manufacturing equipment needed to synthesize these deadly drugs.
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