Action Also Targets Hizballah Gold Scheme Benefitting Iran’s Military
WASHINGTON—Today, the Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) intensified pressure on Iran’s illicit oil transportation infrastructure by sanctioning more than two dozen individuals, companies, and vessels operating within the network of Iranian oil shipping magnate Mohammad Hossein Shamkhani (Shamkhani), the son of now-deceased senior Iranian security official Ali Shamkhani.
“Treasury is moving aggressively with Economic Fury by targeting regime elites like the Shamkhani family that attempt to profit at the expense of the Iranian people,” said Secretary of the Treasury Scott Bessent. “Under President Trump’s leadership, Treasury will continue to cut off Iran’s illicit smuggling and terror proxy networks. Financial institutions should be on notice that Treasury will leverage all tools and authorities, including secondary sanctions, against those that continue to support Tehran’s terrorist activities.”
Shamkhani heads a multi-billion dollar Iranian and Russian petroleum sales empire that enriches a family connected to the highest echelons of the Iranian regime at the expense of the Iranian people. Today’s action builds on OFAC’s July 2025 designation of the Shamkhani network—which remains its largest single action to date since the Trump Administration revived the maximum pressure campaign against Iran.
In a joint investigation with Homeland Security Investigations (HSI), OFAC is also designating Iranian national and Lebanese Hizballah-financier Seyed Naiemaei Badroddin Moosavi and three companies linked to a complex money laundering scheme involving the sale of Iranian oil in exchange for Venezuelan gold under the former Venezuelan dictatorship, all ultimately on behalf of Hizballah and Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps–Qods Force (IRGC-QF).
Today’s action is being taken pursuant to Executive Order (E.O.) 13902, which provides authority to the Secretary of the Treasury, in consultation with the Secretary of State, to identify and impose sanctions on key sectors of Iran’s economy, and the counterterrorism authority E.O. 13224, as amended by E.O. 13886 (“E.O. 13224, as amended”). It marks the latest round of sanctions targeting Iranian oil sales and proxies such as Hizballah since the President issued National Security Presidential Memorandum 2 (NSPM-2), instituting a campaign of maximum economic pressure on Iran and its regional proxies. Since the issuance of NSPM-2, OFAC has sanctioned over 1,000 persons, vessels, and aircraft as part of this campaign.
Network Uses Front Companies to Evade Sanctions and Finance Iranian Regime
The Shamkhani network evades sanctions through a group of seemingly legitimate administrative, consulting, and shipping firms that manage all aspects of the network’s fleet. These firms and their employees maintain a robust public presence to provide a veneer of legitimacy while allowing the network to support the Iranian regime and enrich the Shamkhani family.
UAE-based Oriel Group is a shipping, commodity, and logistics company under which much of the Shamkhani network’s operations fall, including many of the shipping and commodity trading firms sanctioned in July 2025. One such company, UAE-based Corplinx Consultancy LLC FZ (Corplinx), acts as an administrative, consulting, and business services firm within the Shamkhani umbrella of companies. Shamkhani network employees use Corplinx web domains to disguise the financial and corporate operations of the network. Another such company,
UAE-based House of Shipping Investment FZCO (House of Shipping), acts as a shipping firm for Mohammad Hossein Shamkhani and his business partners. House of Shipping Private Limited is the Indian office for, and a direct subsidiary of, House of Shipping. UAE-based Shipstar Shipchandling LLC, a company controlled by House of Shipping, provides supplies to the Shamkhani network’s shipping operations, including parts and provisions to ensure vessels can stay crewed and in good repair on the water.
UAE-based Meritron DMCC (Meritron) is a Shamkhani front company used to clandestinely procure new vessels for the network’s shipping operations and facilitate the transportation of sanctioned petroleum products from Iran. Between 2025 and early 2026, Meritron sought to purchase two new construction vessels, worth tens of millions of dollars, from South Korea on behalf of the Shamkhani network. Meritron replaced designated Shamkhani company Teodor Shipping L.L.C. in this transaction and has contributed tens of millions of dollars toward the vessels’ construction. Meritron DMCC was previously managed by Shamkhani network associate Elisabetta Cadeddu and is a former subsidiary of Max Energy Fuel Trading LLC, both of which were sanctioned as part of OFAC’s July 2025 action against the network.
UAE-based Chetan Prakash Balhotra is a director of Meritron and has worked on behalf of U.S.-designated ship management firm Marvise SMC DMCC. Marvise SMC DMCC shifted operations to UAE-based Helmatic Consultancy DMCC following its July 2025 designation. UAE-based Tanjore Sunilkumar Srinivas has served as an official of multiple firms in the Shamkhani network, including by acting as a procurement manager for Marvise SMC DMCC, and as an executive in multiple Shamkhani-associated companies.
UAE-based Taylor Shipping FZCO (Taylor Shipping), formerly known as Lazar Shipping, which was also affiliated with Marvise SMC DMCC, is a shipping company that has held key roles with multiple sanctioned vessels in the Shamkhani fleet. For example, the Shamkhani network tapped Taylor Shipping to manage the sanctioned vessel YUG as it delivered Iranian commodities to East Asia on behalf of Iranian Armed Forces General Staff front company Sepehr Energy Jahan. Marshall Islands-based Shipza Shipping Limited similarly acts as a Shamkhani network shipping company and has been linked to multiple sanctioned vessels used by the network to transport cargo, including STAR (IMO 9436484) and TAVA 4 (IMO 9292151; formerly MOANA).
House of Shipping Investment FZCO, Taylor Shipping FZCO, Corplinx Consultancy LLC FZ, Helmatic Consultancy DMCC, Oriel Group, and Chetan Prakash Balhotra are being designated pursuant to E.O. 13902 for having materially assisted, sponsored, or provided financial, material, or technological support for, or goods or services to or in support of, Mohammad Hossein Shamkhani.
Shipza Shipping Limited, Meritron DMCC, and Tanjore Sunilkumar Srinivas are being designated pursuant to E.O. 13902 for being owned or controlled by, or having acted or purported to act for or on behalf of, directly or indirectly, Mohammad Hossein Shamkhani. Shipstar Shipchandling LLC and House of Shipping Private Limited are being designated pursuant to E.O. 13902 for being owned or controlled by, or having acted or purported to act for or on behalf of, directly or indirectly, House of Shipping Investment FZCO.
TARGETING SHADOW FLEET VESSELS GENERATING BILLIONS OF DOLLARS
Mohammad Hossein Shamkhani continues to rely on a mix of crude oil, oil product, and liquified petroleum gas (LPG) tankers to generate billions of dollars for the Iranian and Russian regimes. Today, OFAC is taking action against the following vessels and shell companies operating as part of the Shamkhani network’s fleet:
- Marshall Islands-based company Aura Lines Inc. is the registered owner, operator, and manager of the Mozambique-flagged AURA (IMO 9274563). AURA regularly transports shipments of Iranian LPG, carrying more than three million barrels of Iranian LPG since the beginning of 2025. AURA has been part of the Shamkhani network’s fleet since 2024.
- India-based Fleet Tanqo Private Limited (Fleet Tanqo) manages the Panama-flagged HORAE (IMO 9413004), VERSA (IMO 9379301), ANAYA (IMO 9326885), DAPHNE V (IMO 9321677), and Cameroon-flagged SILVAR (IMO 9291262), which have all transported multiple cargoes of Russian oil or petroleum products on behalf of the Shamkhani network. Fleet Tanqo’s fleet transported more than 20 cargoes of Russian petroleum products in 2025.
- Marshall Islands-based Hapuka Marine Ltd., Nardie International S.A., and Anika Lines Inc. manage, own, and operate the following vessels: Cameroon-flagged CAUVERI (IMO 9282508), Panama-flagged BELLARIS (IMO 9332614), and Panama-flagged ANIKA (IMO 9417464). CAUVERI, BELLARIS, and ANIKA have each transported millions of barrels of Russian oil or petroleum products on behalf of the Shamkhani network.
Aura Lines Inc. is being designated pursuant to E.O. 13902 for operating in the petroleum sector of the Iranian economy. AURA is being identified as property in which Aura Lines Inc. has an interest.
The following companies are being designated pursuant to E.O. 13902 for having materially assisted, sponsored, or provided financial, material, or technological support for, or goods or services to or in support of, Mohammad Hossein Shamkhani:
- Fleet Tanqo Private Limited
- Hapuka Marine Ltd.
- Nardie International S.A.
- Anika Lines Inc.
The following vessels are being identified as blocked property of the previously identified blocked persons:
- SILVAR (Fleet Tanqo Private Limited)
- VERSA (Fleet Tanqo Private Limited)
- ANAYA (Fleet Tanqo Private Limited)
- DAPHNE V (Fleet Tanqo Private Limited)
- HORAE (Fleet Tanqo Private Limited)
- CAUVERI (Hapuka Marine Ltd.)
- BELLARIS (Nardie International S.A.)
- ANIKA (Anika Lines Inc.)
IRANIAN illicit OIL AND south american GOLD NETWORK LINKED TO HIZBALLAH
As part of a joint investigation with HSI, OFAC is targeting Iranian illicit oil and gold smuggling that serve as part of the regime’s financing streams for terrorist activities, including those of Hizballah. Iranian national and Hizballah-financier Seyed Naiemaei Badroddin Moosavi (Moosavi), who is also linked to Iran’s IRGC-QF, has facilitated terror-financing activity in conjunction with others, including leaders within former Venezuelan President Nicolas Maduro’s regime. Moosavi’s connections to the former Venezuelan regime include direct contact with the former dictator Maduro, and he had assumed some of U.S.-designated Alex Saab’s financial facilitation efforts after Saab’s previous arrest in 2020.
For more than five years, Moosavi cultivated a financial facilitation network of nefarious actors throughout the world to circumvent U.S. sanctions on Iranian oil for the benefit of Hizballah and the Iranian regime. Moosavi smuggled Iranian oil to Maduro’s regime in exchange for gold, including gold procured at below-market rates. These were sent back to Iran for the IRGC-QF as part of a financing channel for Hizballah. This was accomplished by transferring the gold on U.S.-designated Mahan Air to Hizballah members in Tehran, including U.S.-designated Hizballah financier Ali Qasir, from where the gold would then be smuggled to Türkiye for sale. Moosavi was allowed unimpeded movement throughout Maduro’s Venezuela due to his connections to the former regime.
Moosavi worked with U.S.-designated narcotics trafficker Tarek Zaidan El Aissami Maddah and U.S.-designated illicit shipping facilitator Viktor Artemov to smuggle Iranian oil into Maduro’s Venezuela for the benefit of the dictatorial regime, utilizing smuggling tactics such as ship-to-ship transfers, automatic identification system spoofing, and zombie tankers to facilitate the oil smuggling, which was paid for with gold and diamonds. Moosavi is also tied to the sale of Iranian LPG and crude oil and worked with his business partner, U.S.-designated Iran gas magnate Seyed Emamjomeh, to use a number of companies, including U.S.-designated Caspian Petrochemical FZE and Pearl Petrochemical FZE, to conduct facilitation activities.
Moosavi is closely affiliated with three companies: Netherlands-based A.C.S. Global BV and UAE-based ACS Trading LLC and Lotus Universal LLC.
Seyed Naiemaei Badroddin Moosavi is being designated pursuant to E.O. 13224, as amended, for having materially assisted, sponsored, or provided financial, material, or technological support for, or goods or services to or in support of, Hizballah.
ACS Trading LLC is being designated pursuant to E.O. 13224, as amended, for having materially assisted, sponsored, or provided financial, material, or technological support for, or goods or services to or in support of, Seyed Naiemaei Badroddin Moosavi.
A.C.S. Global BV and Lotus Universal LLC are being designated pursuant to E.O. 13224, as amended, for being owned, controlled, or directed by, or having acted or having purported to act for or on behalf of, directly or indirectly, Seyed Naiemaei Badroddin Moosavi.
SANCTIONS IMPLICATION
As a result of today’s action, all property and interests in property of the designated or blocked persons described above that are in the United States or in the possession or control of U.S. persons are blocked and must be reported to OFAC. In addition, any entities that are owned, directly or indirectly, individually or in the aggregate, or 50 percent or more by one or more blocked persons are also blocked. Unless authorized by OFAC, or exempt, OFAC’s regulations generally prohibit all transactions by U.S. persons or within (or transiting) the United States that involve any property or interests in property of designated or otherwise blocked persons.
Violations of U.S. sanctions may result in the imposition of civil or criminal penalties on U.S. and foreign persons. OFAC may impose civil penalties for sanctions violations on a strict liability basis. OFAC’s Economic Sanctions Enforcement Guidelines provide more information regarding OFAC’s enforcement of U.S. economic sanctions. In addition, financial institutions and other persons may risk exposure to sanctions for engaging in certain transactions or activities involving designated or otherwise blocked persons. The prohibitions include the making of any contribution or provision of funds, goods, or services by, to, or for the benefit of any designated person, or the receipt of any contribution or provision of funds, goods, or services from any such person. Non-U.S. persons are also prohibited from causing or conspiring to cause U.S. persons to wittingly or unwittingly violate U.S. sanctions, as well as engaging in conduct that evades U.S. sanctions. Individuals located in the U.S. or abroad who provide information about sanctions violations to Treasury’s Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN) Whistleblower Incentive Program may be eligible for awards if the information they provide leads to a successful enforcement action that results in monetary penalties exceeding $1,000,000.
The power and integrity of OFAC sanctions derive not only from OFAC’s ability to designate and add persons to the SDN List, but also from its willingness to remove persons from the SDN List consistent with the law. The ultimate goal of sanctions is not to punish, but to bring about a positive change in behavior. For information concerning the process for seeking removal from an OFAC list, including the SDN List, or to submit a request, please refer to OFAC’s guidance on Filing a Petition for Removal from an OFAC List
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