U.S. Department of the Treasury

Crackdown Targets Chinese Teapot Refinery; 40 Shipping Firms and Vessels

WASHINGTON—Today, the U.S. Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) sanctioned China-based independent teapot refinery Hengli Petrochemical (Dalian) Refinery Co., Ltd. (Hengli). China-based independent teapot refineries continue to play a vital role in sustaining Iran’s oil economy, and Hengli is one of Iran’s largest customers for crude oil and other petroleum products, having purchased billions of dollars’ worth of Iranian petroleum.  Additionally, OFAC is targeting approximately 40 shipping firms and vessels that operate as part of Iran’s shadow fleet, whose transportation of petroleum and petrochemicals provides a financial lifeline to Iran’s unstable regime. Economic Fury continues to disrupt Iran’s ability to generate the revenue that enables Tehran’s reckless activities throughout the Middle East and its capacity to threaten American interests.  

“Economic Fury is imposing a financial stranglehold on the Iranian regime, hampering its aggression in the Middle East, and helping to curtail its nuclear ambitions,” said Secretary of the Treasury Scott Bessent.  “At President Trump’s direction, Treasury will continue to constrict the network of vessels, intermediaries, and buyers Iran relies on to move its oil to global markets. Any person or vessel facilitating these flows—through covert trade and finance—risks exposure to U.S. sanctions.”

Today’s action is being taken pursuant to Executive Order (E.O.) 13902, which targets persons operating in Iran’s petroleum and petrochemical sectors and is in furtherance of the President’s National Security Presidential Memorandum 2 (NSPM-2), which undergirds Treasury’s continued campaign of maximum economic pressure against Iran’s shadow banking, money laundering, and sanctions evasion networks.  Since February 2025, OFAC has sanctioned over 1,000 Iran-related persons, vessels, and aircraft as part of this campaign. 

CHINA-BASED TEAPOT REFINERY FUELS IRAN’S ARMED FORCES

China’s independent oil refineries, colloquially known as “teapots,” purchase the majority of Iran’s crude oil, providing a vital source of revenue to the Iranian regime and its armed forces. Hengli Petrochemical (Dalian) Refinery Co., Ltd., China’s second-largest teapot refinery, has emerged as one of Tehran’s most valued customers, purchasing billions of dollars’ worth of its oil products.  Since at least 2023, Hengli has received Iranian oil cargoes from a host of sanctioned shadow fleet vessels, including BIG MAG (IMO 9263215), GALE (IMO 9294240), and ARES (IMO 9174397), which alone have delivered over five million barrels of Iranian crude oil. 

Hengli has played an outsized role in purchasing crude oil from Iran’s armed forces. Since at least 2023, Hengli has received Iranian crude oil shipments overseen by the oil sales arm of Iran’s Armed Forces General Staff, Sepehr Energy Jahan Nama Pars Company, generating hundreds of millions of dollars in revenue for the Iranian military. 

Treasury has previously targeted four teapot refineries as part of President Trump’s maximum pressure campaign.

Shadow Fleet Facilitates Illicit Oil Flows to Support Regime 

The Iranian shadow fleet serves as the critical link between Iranian oil producers and end users in Asia. Today, OFAC is sanctioning 19 shadow fleet vessels responsible for transporting billions of dollars’ worth of Iranian crude oil, liquified petroleum gas (LPG), and other petroleum and petrochemical products to foreign markets, further narrowing the Iranian regime’s options for sustaining its energy sales, the lifeblood of its economy. The following vessels are being added to OFAC’s Specially Designated Nationals and Blocked Persons List (SDN List) as blocked property of their designated owner or manager: 

• The Panama-flagged oil tanker LISBOA (IMO 9257711), owned by Hong Kong-based Lisboa Shipping Company Limited, transported eight cargoes of Iranian naphtha, totaling over 2.5 million barrels, to the United Arab Emirates (UAE) between July 2025 and January 2026. 
• The Panama-flagged LPG SEVAN (IMO 9177806), owned by Marshall Islands-based Anka Energy and Logistics Company, transported multiple cargoes of Iranian propane and butane, approximately 750,000 barrels, to Bangladesh between August and November 2025. 
• The Hong Kong-flagged oil tanker LYNN (IMO 9352559), owned and operated by Hong Kong-based Ting Tao Company Limited, engaged in ship-to-ship transfers of Iranian crude oil with a shadow fleet tanker off the coast of Malaysia in May 2025, ultimately delivering the cargo to China. 
• The Panama-flagged oil tanker GLOBAL VIVIAN (IMO 9002908), owned, operated, and managed by Vietnam-based Thien An Hoa Binh Company Limited, transported multiple cargoes of Iranian propane and butane, some 1.6 million barrels, between April and October 2025.  The cargo was ultimately delivered to the UAE. 
• The Hong Kong-flagged oil tanker MAGNOLIA (IMO 9258519), owned, operated, and managed by British Virgin Islands-based Nice Gift Limited, transported approximately two million barrels of Iranian crude oil to China in January 2026. 
• The Vanuatu-flagged oil tanker SEEKER 8 (IMO 9294329), owned by Marshall Islands-based Reayou Company Limited, transported over four million barrels of Iranian crude oil between January and February 2026, ultimately discharging the cargo in China.
• The unknown-flagged oil tanker STELLAR BEVERLY (IMO 9208069), owned by Hong Kong-based Yegua Trading Limited, transported over two million barrels of Iranian crude oil between August and October 2025, ultimately delivering the cargo to China.
• The Panama-flagged oil tanker COVENIO (IMO 9263227), owned by Hong Kong-based Extensive Shipping Limited, has transported more than six million barrels of Iranian oil to China since early 2025.
• The Comoros-flagged oil tanker GOLDEN SUNRISE (IMO 9183362), owned by Hong Kong-based Xifoides Group Limited, has transported several million barrels of Iranian oil to China since mid-2025.
• The Barbados-flagged oil tanker ZHEN ZHU (IMO 9290359), managed and operated by China-based Zhoushan Yaohai Shipping Co., Ltd., has transported more than four million barrels of Iranian oil to China since late 2025.
• The Barbados-flagged oil tanker BANGUS (IMO 9308998), owned by Hong Kong-based Costin Shipping Limited, has transported more than a million barrels of Iranian oil to China since mid-2025.
• The Comoros-flagged oil tanker MIRAAN (IMO 9242481), owned by Marshall Islands-based Mihir Shipping Inc., has transported hundreds of thousands of barrels of Iranian high sulfur fuel oil (HSFO) as recently as early 2026.
• The Antigua and Barbuda-flagged oil tanker LIN 9 (IMO 9240158), owned by Marshall Islands-based Patriot Inc., has transported hundreds of thousands of barrels of Iranian ethylene since late 2023 through early 2026.  
• The Panama-flagged oil tanker GALVIN (IMO 9387762), owned by Panama-based Naxos Maritime and Trading S.A., has transported approximately two million barrels of Iranian LPG since early 2025.
• The Panama-flagged oil tanker HH GLORY (IMO 9534614), owned by Panama-based Skyros Maritime and Trading S.A., has transported hundreds of thousands of barrels of Iranian LPG since 2025.
• The Panama-flagged oil tanker ANSHUN II (IMO 9253117), owned by Cayman Islands-based Laurel Shipping Ltd, has transported millions of barrels of Iranian oil since 2024.
• The Panama-flagged SMD WORLD (IMO 9290086), owned by UAE-based Lepus Navigation Ltd, has transported millions of barrels of Iranian oil since mid-2025.
• The Marshall Islands-flagged oil tanker EDOR (IMO 9259317), owned by China-based Dofa Shipping Ltd, has transported millions of barrels of Iranian HSFO since late 2025.
• The Cook Islands-flagged oil tanker BENTLEY (IMO 9220914), owned by Liberia-based Evy Blue Ltd, has transported millions of barrels of Iranian HSFO since late 2025.

The following persons are being designated pursuant to E.O. 13902 for operating in the petroleum or petrochemical sectors of the Iranian economy: 

• Lisboa Shipping Company Limited;
• Anka Energy and Logistics Company;
• Ting Tao Company Limited;
• Thien An Hoa Binh Company Limited;
• Nice Gift Limited;
• Reayou Company Limited;
• Yegua Trading Limited;
• Extensive Shipping Limited;
• Xifoides Group Limited;
• Zhoushan Yaohai Shipping Co., Ltd;
• Costin Shipping Limited;
• Mihir Shipping Inc.;
• Patriot Inc.;
• Naxos Maritime and Trading S.A.;
• Laurel Shipping Ltd;
• Lepus Navigation Ltd;
• Dofa Shipping Ltd; 
• Skyros Maritime and Trading S.A.; and
• Evy Blue Ltd.

SANCTIONS IMPLICATIONS

All property and interests in property of the persons described above that are in the United States or in the possession or control of U.S. persons are blocked and must be reported to OFAC.  In addition, any entities that are owned, directly or indirectly, individually or in the aggregate, 50 percent or more by one or more blocked persons are also blocked.  Unless authorized by OFAC, or exempt, OFAC’s regulations generally prohibit all transactions by U.S. persons or within (or transiting) the United States that involve any property or interests in property of blocked persons. 

Violations of U.S. sanctions may result in the imposition of civil or criminal penalties on U.S. and foreign persons.  OFAC may impose civil penalties for sanctions violations on a strict liability basis.  OFAC’s Economic Sanctions Enforcement Guidelines provide more information regarding OFAC’s enforcement of U.S. economic sanctions.  In addition, financial institutions and other persons may risk exposure to sanctions for engaging in certain transactions or activities involving designated or otherwise blocked persons.  The prohibitions include the making of any contribution or provision of funds, goods, or services by, to, or for the benefit of any designated or blocked person, or the receipt of any contribution or provision of funds, goods, or services from any such person.  Non-U.S. persons are also prohibited from causing or conspiring to cause U.S. persons to wittingly or unwittingly violate U.S. sanctions, as well as engaging in conduct that evades U.S. sanctions.  Individuals located in the U.S. or abroad who provide information about sanctions violations to FinCEN’s whistleblower incentive program may be eligible for awards if the information they provide leads to a successful enforcement action that results in monetary penalties exceeding $1,000,000.

The power and integrity of OFAC sanctions derive not only from OFAC’s ability to designate and add persons to the SDN List, but also from its willingness to remove persons from the SDN List consistent with the law.  The ultimate goal of sanctions is not to punish, but to bring about a positive change in behavior.  For information concerning the process for seeking removal from an OFAC list, including the SDN List, or to submit a request, please refer to OFAC’s guidance on Filing a Petition for Removal from an OFAC List.

Click here for more information on the persons designated and any property identified as blocked property today.