WASHINGTON— Today, the U.S. Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) is taking additional action against Iran’s military oil sales, which is enabling the regime’s ability to fund the rebuilding of its armed forces and pose continued threats to the United States and its partners in the region. Iran’s military generates revenue through Iranian crude oil sales via an array of front companies to help fund its reconstitution and threaten its neighbors.
"The Treasury Department will continue to increase pressure on Iranian oil sales to deprive the Iranian regime and its military of the financial resources it needs to threaten U.S. allies and partners in the Middle East," said Secretary of the Treasury Scott Bessent. "We will not allow the Iranian government to increase its oil revenue for the purpose of reconstituting its armed forces and military capabilities."
Today’s action is being taken pursuant to the counterterrorism authority, Executive Order (E.O.) 13224, as amended. It continues Treasury’s robust sanctions campaign targeting Iranian oil sales in support of Economic Fury and the President’s National Security Presidential Memorandum 2 (NSPM-2), instituting a campaign of maximum economic pressure on Iran.
Additionally, the U.S. Department of State’s Rewards for Justice program is offering a reward of up to $15 million for information leading to the disruption of the financial mechanisms of the IRGC and its various branches. More information is available on the RFJ website.
ECONOMIC FURY DELIVERS MAXIMUM PRESSURE ON IRAN
The Treasury Department is maintaining maximum pressure on Iran and targeting the regime’s ability to generate, move, and repatriate funds. Treasury is aggressively advancing Economic Fury and has disrupted tens of billions of dollars’ worth of revenue from being otherwise accessible to the Iranian regime and its proxies. This includes actions that have led to the freezing of nearly half a billion dollars in regime-linked cryptocurrency. In addition, Treasury has cracked down on Tehran’s global shadow banking networks; designated networks supplying weapons and other military components to Iran; sanctioned a corrupt Iraqi official who has facilitated the sale of oil along with Iran-backed militias operating in Iraq; taken numerous actions against Iran’s terrorist proxies; and targeted shadow fleet vessels, companies, and other entities that sustain Iran’s illicit oil industry.
Through the blockade, the Trump Administration is directly targeting the regime’s primary revenue stream. Any person or vessel facilitating the illicit trade of oil or other commodities, through covert trade or financial channels, risks exposure to U.S. sanctions.
Treasury will continue to vigorously target both traditional sanctions evasion schemes and the exploitation of digital assets while continuing to freeze funds stolen from the Iranian people. Treasury is also prepared to take action against any foreign company supporting illicit Iranian commerce, including airlines, and, as necessary, may impose secondary sanctions on foreign financial institutions that facilitate Iran’s activities.
Additionally, Treasury recently warned of the sanctions risk associated with complying with Iranian demands for passage through the Strait of Hormuz such as “toll” payments, including payments made via fiat currency, digital assets, offsets, informal swaps, or other in-kind payments such as nominally charitable donations, and providing sensitive vessel information. On May 27, 2026, Treasury designated Iran’s so-called “Persian Gulf Strait Authority,” an IRGC-linked scheme to extort international shipping seeking to transit the Strait of Hormuz.
IRANIAN MILITARY OIL SALES
Sepehr Energy Jahan Nama Pars Company (Sepehr Energy Jahan), the oil sales arm of Iran’s Armed Forces General Staff, remains a key node in Iran’s crude oil and petroleum export network. Sepehr Energy Jahan’s oil exports depend on access to shadow fleet vessels willing to transport the military’s oil. Throughout late 2024 and early 2025, Sepehr Energy Jahan used United Arab Emirates (UAE)-based vessel chartering company Luan Bird Shipping Service LLC (Luan Bird) to ship Iranian oil to China and to pay commissions to Hong Kong-based Growth Trading Co., Limited for its role in Sepehr Energy Jahan crude oil shipments aboard the sanctioned vessels BOREAS (IMO 9248497; now URI), SIRI (IMO 9281683), and OXIS (IMO 9224805).
Similarly, Hong Kong-based Damai Technology Development Limited (Damai Technology)has served as the charterer of multiple vessels carrying Iranian oil on behalf of the Iranian armed forces since mid-2025, including the IRGC.
Growth Trading Co., Limited and Damai Technology Development Limited are being designated pursuant to E.O. 13224, as amended, for having materially assisted, sponsored, or provided financial, material, or technological support for, or goods or services to or in support of, Sepehr Energy Jahan.
In addition to using front companies to charter vessels, Sepehr Energy Jahan also uses front companies to serve numerous other roles in Iran’s oil export supply chain. Hong Kong-based Tida Co., Limited is a Sepehr Energy Jahan front company that frequently serves as the shipper and consignee of Iran’s military oil cargoes. In early 2024, Tida Co., Limited shipped nearly two million barrels of Iranian crude oil, worth over $100 million, to Dongjiakou, China, on board the HECATE, then known as the ATILAN. In early 2025, Sepehr Energy Jahan used Tida Co., Limited to deliver nearly two million barrels of Iranian crude oil on board the SIRI to Dalian.
Hong Kong-based Mehdiyev Trading Co., Limited (Mehdiyev Trading), another Sepehr Energy Jahan front company, has likewise facilitated the shipment of Iranian crude oil to China on behalf of the Iranian armed forces. Throughout 2024, U.S.-designated Sepehr Energy Jahan front company Star Energy International Limited made multiple payments to Mehdiyev Trading. These payment amounts coincided with the storage and other port fees Mehdiyev Trading paid for Iranian oil stored in shore tanks in Qingdao, China while the oil awaited final delivery to Chinese buyers.
Sanctioned Iranian entities also use the Iranian armed forces’ oil sales infrastructure to procure oil products from outside Iran. For example, Hong Kong-based Worth Seen Energy Limited procures refined petroleum products for NIOC on behalf of Sepehr Energy Jahan. In January 2025, Worth Seen Energy Limited supplied NIOC with hundreds of thousands of barrels of gasoline, loaded in the UAE and transported to Bandar Abbas, Iran.
Tida Co., Limited, Mehdiyev Trading Co., Limited, and Worth Seen Energy Limited are being designated pursuant to E.O. 13224, as amended, for being owned, controlled, or directed by, or having acted or purported to act for or on behalf of, directly or indirectly, Sepehr Energy Jahan.
SANCTIONS IMPLICATIONS
As a result of today’s action, all property and interests in property of the designated or blocked person described above that are in the United States or in the possession or control of U.S. persons are blocked and must be reported to OFAC. In addition, any entities that are owned, directly or indirectly, individually or in the aggregate, 50 percent or more by one or more blocked persons are also blocked. Unless authorized by a general or specific license issued by OFAC, or exempt, OFAC’s regulations generally prohibit all transactions by U.S. persons or within (or transiting) the United States that involve any property or interests in property of blocked persons.
Violations of U.S. sanctions may result in the imposition of civil or criminal penalties on U.S. and foreign persons. OFAC may impose civil penalties for sanctions violations on a strict liability basis. OFAC’s Economic Sanctions Enforcement Guidelines provide more information regarding OFAC’s enforcement of U.S. economic sanctions. The prohibitions include the making of any contribution or provision of funds, goods, or services by, to, or for the benefit of any designated or blocked person, or the receipt of any contribution or provision of funds, goods, or services from any such person. Non-U.S. persons are also prohibited from causing or conspiring to cause U.S. persons to wittingly or unwittingly violate U.S. sanctions, as well as engaging in conduct that evades U.S. sanctions. In addition, financial institutions and other persons may risk exposure to sanctions for engaging in certain transactions or activities involving designated or otherwise blocked persons. Individuals located in the U.S. or abroad who provide information about sanctions violations to FinCEN’s whistleblower incentive program may be eligible for awards if the information they provide leads to a successful enforcement action that results in monetary penalties exceeding $1,000,000.
Furthermore, engaging in certain transactions involving the persons designated today may risk the imposition of secondary sanctions on participating foreign financial institutions. OFAC can prohibit or impose strict conditions on opening or maintaining, in the United States, a correspondent account or a payable-through account of a foreign financial institution that knowingly conducts or facilitates any significant transaction on behalf of a person who is designated pursuant to the relevant authority.
The power and integrity of OFAC sanctions derive not only from OFAC’s ability to designate and add persons to the Specially Designated Nationals and Blocked Persons List (SDN List), but also from its willingness to remove persons from the SDN List consistent with the law. The ultimate goal of sanctions is not to punish, but to bring about a positive change in behavior. For information concerning the process for seeking removal from an OFAC list, including the SDN List, or to submit a request, please refer to OFAC’s guidance on Filing a Petition for Removal from an OFAC List.
Click here for more information on the persons designated today.
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