Largest Treasury Action Against the Iran-Backed Group
WASHINGTON — Today, the U.S. Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) is taking its single largest action to date against Iran-backed Ansarallah, commonly known as the Houthis, targeting four individuals, 12 entities, and two vessels that have imported oil and other illicit goods in support of the terrorist group. This action includes Houthi front companies, their owners, and other key Houthi operatives that generate significant revenue for the group through the sale of oil and other commodities on Yemen’s black market and by engaging in smuggling operations through Houthi-controlled ports. As part of this action, Treasury is also targeting two vessels, as well as their owners and operators, which violated U.S. sanctions by discharging oil derivatives to the Houthis.
“The Houthis rely on a series of front companies and trusted facilitators to clandestinely generate revenue, procure weapons components, and advance their reign of terror in partnership with the Iranian regime,” said Deputy Secretary of the Treasury Michael Faulkender. “Today’s action—our most significant to date against the group—underscores our commitment to disrupting the Houthis’ financial and shipping pipelines that enable their reckless behavior in the Red Sea and the surrounding region.”
Today’s action is being taken pursuant to Executive Order (E.O.) 13224, as amended, and builds on OFAC’s June 17, 2024, July 31, 2024, October 2, 2024, December 19, 2024, March 5, 2025, April 2, 2025, and April 28, 2025 actions targeting Houthi leaders, weapons procurement operatives, and suppliers. The U.S. Department of State designated the Houthis as a Specially Designated Global Terrorist (SDGT) effective February 16, 2024, and subsequently re-designated the group as a Foreign Terrorist Organization (FTO) on March 5, 2025. Providing material support to the Houthis not only carries acute sanctions risk, but also exposes vessels and crew members to serious safety risk from potential Houthi attacks.
HOUTHI OIL TRADERS AND SHIPPING FACILITATORS
The Houthis use a web of trusted companies headquartered in Sana’a and Hudaydah, Yemen to facilitate the sale of oil across Houthi-controlled territory in Yemen, many of which are directly linked to high-ranking Houthi operatives. Houthi leaders charge Yemenis exorbitant prices for oil and oil derivatives, pocketing the proceeds from these sales for personal gain and to fund the group’s militant operations.
Black Diamond Petroleum Derivatives (Black Diamond) is a Sana’a-based company that facilitates oil sales and payments in support of the Houthis. Black Diamond is tied to key Houthi leaders and businessmen, including the U.S.-designated Houthi spokesperson Mohammed Abdulsalam (Abdulsalam), who manages Black Diamond’s operations. Black Diamond smuggled Iranian oil into Yemen, and the Houthi movement relied on the revenue from the sale of this oil for its operations. Houthi leaders have also showcased Black Diamond’s ability to import tens of thousands of tons of oil every month during negotiations with representatives from the Russian government over future oil deals between the Houthis and Moscow.
Star Plus Yemen (Star Plus) is a Hudaydah-based company that operates under the direction of Abdulsalam and other prominent Houthi operatives. Star Plus acts as a broker between Houthi-aligned front companies and suppliers to extract revenue from oil sales within Yemen. In addition to supporting Houthi oil importation schemes, Star Plus has also facilitated Houthi efforts to purchase and smuggle dual-use components used to manufacture weapons from suppliers in Asia into Houthi-controlled ports.
Tamco Establishment for Oil Derivatives (Tamco), headquartered in Sana’a, is a key front company in the Houthis’ oil smuggling network, enabling Houthi operatives to conceal the true beneficiaries and end-users of imported oil and other commodities. Tamco operates under the supervision of Houthi operatives and affiliates, including Abdulsalam.
The Sana’a-based Royal Plus Shipping Services and Commercial Agencies (Royal Plus) is a front company that has enabled Houthi oil smuggling and sales. Royal Plus has facilitated the sale of oil sourced from the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC), delivering the proceeds from these sales to Houthi leaders in exchange for a privileged position within the Houthis’ oil derivatives market. Royal Plus has also acted as a payments facilitator in support of Houthi procurement efforts, managing financial transfers between the Houthis, Russia, and Iran for the purchase and acquisition of weapons and other military equipment, including UAV engines.
Yahya Al-Usaili Company for Import Limited (Al-Usaili Co) is a Houthi front company that coordinates with Houthi operatives in Sana’a to import oil in exchange for foreign currency. Al-Usaili Co makes and receives payments for oil sales using accounts held at banks located in Houthi-controlled territory, which enables Al-Usaili Co to hide the end-users and beneficiaries of these sales in support of Houthi smuggling efforts. Al-Usaili Co maintained connections with the IRGC, which it leveraged to facilitate the importation of petroleum products for the Houthis.
Gasoline Aman Company for Oil Derivatives Imports (Gasoline Aman), headquartered in Sana’a, is a Houthi front company that facilitates Houthi oil smuggling operations. The Houthis allow Gasoline Aman and other front companies to receive a small percentage fee from each oil sale in exchange for hiding Houthi involvement in the transaction.
Azzahra Establishment for Commerce and Agencies (Azzahra) is a Houthi front company that plays a key role in transferring funds from oil sales to Houthi operatives and Houthi-affiliated organizations. Azzahra has enabled the Houthis to extract revenue from oil sales by laundering hundreds of millions of dollars for Houthi leaders in Hudaydah.
Yemen Elaph Petroleum Derivatives Import (Yemen Elaph) is a Sana’a-based oil import company owned by Houthi operative Abdullah Ahsan Abdullah Dabbash (Dabbash). Under Dabbash’s leadership, Yemen Elaph imports, sells, and distributes oil derivatives via the black market in Houthi-controlled areas and is one of only a few Houthi-controlled companies that has exclusive rights to import through the Houthi-controlled ports of Hudaydah and Al-Salif.
Abbot Trading Co., Ltd. (Abbot) is a Sana’a-based shipping and logistics company that has generated revenue by facilitating oil and oil derivatives sales in Houthi-controlled areas. Abbot is one of the most important Houthi-affiliated front companies established by Houthi operatives within the past 10 years to control trade in oil derivatives, general trade, and other critical economic sectors. The Houthis funnel profits from Abbot’s activities to finance the group’s attacks and procurement of military-grade items.
Prominent Houthi businessman Ali Ahmed Daghsan Talea (Talea) operates Abbot in coordination with his brother, Houthi smuggling operative Daghsan Ahmed Daghsan (Daghsan). Talea leverages Abbot to generate revenue in support of the Houthis from oil sales and smuggling efforts. Daghsan manages Abbot as one part of a broader network of front companies that funnel vast sums of money to the Houthis from key sectors of Yemen’s economy, including oil and gas, import and export, and general trade. Daghsan, Talea, and other Houthi leaders have coordinated to establish numerous companies registered under the names of Daghsan’s other family members.
Black Diamond Petroleum Derivatives, Star Plus Yemen, Tamco Establishment for Oil Derivatives, Royal Plus Shipping Services and Commercial Agencies, Yahya Al-Usaili Company for Import Limited, Gasoline Aman Company for Oil Derivatives Imports, Azzahra Establishment for Commerce and Agencies, Yemen Elaph Petroleum Derivatives Import, Abbot Trading Co., Ltd., Ali Ahmed Daghsan Talea, and Daghsan Ahmed Daghsan are being designated pursuant to E.O. 13224, as amended, for having materially assisted, sponsored, or provided financial, material, or technological support for, or goods or services to or in support of, Ansarallah.
Abdullah Ahsan Abdullah Dabbash is being designated pursuant to E.O. 13224, as amended, for owning or controlling, directly or indirectly, Yemen Elaph Petroleum Derivatives Import.
HOUTHI-ALIGNED MANAGER OF HUDAYDAH AND AL-SALIF PORTS
Zaid Al-Washli (Al-Washli) is the head of the Houthi-aligned port management company, which controls operations at key Houthi-controlled ports, including Hudaydah and Al-Salif. In his role, Al-Washli also coordinates weapons procurement and smuggling efforts on behalf of the Houthis, including of key dual-use components for use in UAV production. Al-Washli collaborates with Houthi procurement operatives to fill Houthi materiel needs and coordinates with Houthi political operatives to advance the Houthis’ position in negotiations with shipping companies.
Zaid Al-Washli is being designated pursuant to E.O. 13224, as amended, for being owned, controlled, or directed by, or for having acted or purported to act for or on behalf of, directly or indirectly, Ansarallah.
CONTINUED DELIVERY OF REFINED PETROLEUM PRODUCTS TO HOUTHI-CONTROLLED PORTS
On April 28, 2025, OFAC identified three vessels and designated their owners pursuant to E.O. 13224, as amended, for involvement in the discharge of refined petroleum products at Houthi-controlled ports after the expiration of Counter Terrorism General License (GL) 25A. GL 25A wound down a previous authorization enabling the offloading of refined petroleum products in Yemen involving the Houthis through April 4, 2025. The vessels targeted today continued to support the Houthis through the discharge of refined petroleum products at Houthi-controlled ports, including Ras Isa, after the expiration of GL 25A.
Best Way Tanker Corp. (Best Way) and Ocean Voyage LLC (Ocean Voyage) facilitated the delivery of gasoline to the Houthi-controlled port of Ras Isa via the vessel Valente after the expiration of OFAC’s GL 25A. The Valente discharged over 60,000 metric tons of gasoline and departed Ras Isa port on May 17, 2025, over a month after the expiration of GL 25A.
Atlantis M. Shipping Co facilitated the delivery of refined petroleum products into Ras Isa via the Atlantis MZ after the expiration of GL 25A. As of mid-June 2025, the Atlantis MZ had discharged almost 60,000 metric tons of gasoline at Ras Isa port in Yemen, almost two months after the expiration of GL 25A.
The Sarah was identified as blocked property in April 2025 pursuant to E.O. 13224, as amended, under its former name, Tulip BZ, for facilitating the delivery of Liquid Petroleum Gas (LPG) to Ras Isa after the expiration of GL 25A, and in June 2025 was again at berth in Ras Isa to discharge LPG.
Best Way Tanker Corp., Ocean Voyage LLC, and Atlantis M. Shipping Co are being designated pursuant to E.O. 13224, as amended, for having materially assisted, sponsored, or provided financial, material, or technological support for, or goods or services to or in support of, Ansarallah.
The Valente is being identified as property in which Best Way Tanker Corp. has an interest pursuant to E.O. 13224, as amended.
The Atlantis MZ is being identified as property in which Atlantis M. Shipping Co has an interest pursuant to E.O. 13224, as amended.
The SDN List entry for Tulip BZ is being updated to reflect the vessel’s current name, Sarah.
SANCTIONS IMPLICATIONS
As a result of today’s action, all property and interests in property of the designated or blocked persons described above that are in the United States or in the possession or control of U.S. persons are blocked and must be reported to OFAC. In addition, any entities that are owned, directly or indirectly, individually or in the aggregate, 50 percent or more by one or more blocked persons are also blocked. Unless authorized by a general or specific license issued by OFAC, or exempt, OFAC’s regulations generally prohibit all transactions by U.S. persons or within (or transiting) the United States that involve any property or interests in property of blocked persons.
Violations of U.S. sanctions may result in the imposition of civil or criminal penalties on U.S. and foreign persons. OFAC may impose civil penalties for sanctions violations on a strict liability basis. OFAC’s Economic Sanctions Enforcement Guidelines provide more information regarding OFAC’s enforcement of U.S. economic sanctions. In addition, financial institutions and other persons may risk exposure to sanctions for engaging in certain transactions or activities involving designated or otherwise blocked persons. The prohibitions include the making of any contribution or provision of funds, goods, or services by, to, or for the benefit of any designated or blocked person, or the receipt of any contribution or provision of funds, goods, or services from any such person.
Furthermore, engaging in certain transactions involving the persons designated today may risk the imposition of secondary sanctions on participating foreign financial institutions. OFAC can prohibit or impose strict conditions on opening or maintaining, in the United States, a correspondent account or a payable-through account of a foreign financial institution that knowingly conducts or facilitates any significant transaction on behalf of a person who is designated pursuant to the relevant authority.
The power and integrity of OFAC sanctions derive not only from OFAC’s ability to designate and add persons to the SDN List, but also from its willingness to remove persons from the SDN List consistent with the law. The ultimate goal of sanctions is not to punish, but to bring about a positive change in behavior. For information concerning the process for seeking removal from an OFAC list, including the SDN List, or to submit a request, please refer to OFAC’s guidance on Filing a Petition for Removal from an OFAC List.
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